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INTRODUCTION

The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
assistance of counsel to all criminal defendants.' The question of how
* B.A. 1979, University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana. Candidate for J.D., 1984
lIT/Chicago-Kent College of Law. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Professor Marc Kadish in commenting on the final draft of this article.
I. U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI provides, in part:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ... have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defense.
See also ILL. CoNsT., art. 1, § 8, which provides, in part:
In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person
and by counsel ....
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effective 2 the assistance must be has generated controversy in the
courts 3 and in the literature. 4

Unfortunately, the closest the United

Although no definitive legislative history of the sixth amendment's right to counsel exists,
commentators have traced the development of the right. See, e.g., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress (Jayson, ed.)

U.S. Govt. Printing Office, Washington: 1973 Senate Document No. 92-82; W. BEANEY, RIGHT
TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 27-29 (1955) [hereinafter cited as BEANEY].

2. The phrase "effective assistance of counsel" has its genesis in Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45 (1932). Justice Sutherland stated that the duty to appoint counsel "[i]s not discharged by
an assignment at such a time or under such circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective aid
in the preparation and trial of the case." Id. at 71. (emphasis added). Accord McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) ("It has long been recognized that the right to counsel is the
right to the effective assistance of counsel.") (emphasis added).
3. The most comprehensive recent analysis of the issue is found in United States v.
DeCoster, 624 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en bane), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 944 (1979). DeCoster is
discussed in detail in Note, Identifying and Remedying Ineffective Assistance of Criminal Defense
Counsel: A New Look After United States v. DeCoster, 93 HARV. L. REV. 752 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as Note, A New Look].
4. Alpert, Effective Assistance of Counsel: The Exchange Theory, 17 CRIM. L. BULL. 381
(1981); Bazelon, The Realities of Gideon andArgersinger, 64 GEO. L.J. 811 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as Bazelon]; Bazelon, The DefectiveAssistance of Counsel, 42 U. OF CIN. L. REV. I(1973) [hereinafter cited as Defective Assistance]; Beaney, The Right to Counsel Past, Present, and Future, 49
VA. L. REV. 1150 (1963); BEANEY, supra note 1;Bines, Remedying Ineffective Representation in
Criminal Cases. Departures From Habeas Corpus, 59 VA. L. REV. 927 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Bines]; Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Special Training and Certification of Advocates
Essential to Our System of Justice?, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 227 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Burger];
Finer, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 CORNELL L. REv. 1077 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Finer]; Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L.
REV. 142 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Friendlyl; Gard, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel-Standards
and Remedies, 41 Mo. L. REV. 483 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Gard]; Goldstein, The Effective
Assistance of Counsel, Rights of the Defendant/Responsibilities of the Attorney, 67 ILL. B.J. 224
(1978); Grano, The Right to Counsel- Collateral Issues Affecting Due Process, 54 MINN. L. REV.
1175 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Grano]; Maddi, Trial Advocacy Competence: The Judicial Perspective, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 105; Polur, Retained Counsel, Assigned Counsel" Wh',

the Dichotomy?, 55 A.B.A. J.254 (1969); Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure. 70
HARV. L. REV. I (1956) [hereinafter cited as Schaefer]; Schwarzer, Dealing With Incompetent
Counsel-The Trial Judge's Role, 93 HARV. L. REV. 633 (1980); Strazzella, IneffectiveAssistance of
Counsel Claims.- New Uses, New Problems, 19 ARIZ. L. REV. 443 (1977); Tague, The Attempt to
Improve Criminal Defense Representation, 15 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 109 (1977); Waltz, Inadequacy of
Trial Defense Representation as a Groundfor PostconvictionRelief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U. L.
REV. 289 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Waltz]; Note, A New Focus on Prejudice in Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Cases: The Assertion of Rights Standard, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 29 (1983); Note,
Adequacy of Fact Investigation in Criminal Defense Lawyers' Trial Preparation, 1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
523; Note, Inadequate Assistance of Criminal Trial Counsel- The Standards for Illinois, 47 CHIKENT L. REV. 218 (1970); Note, Ineffective Representation As A Basis for Relief From Conviction:
Principles For Appellate Review, 13 COLUM.J.L. & SoC. PROB. 1 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Ineffective Representation ];Note, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The Lingering Debate, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 659 (1980); Note, A New Look, supra note 3; Note, The Constitutional Mandate of
Effective Assistance of Counsel: The Duty to Investigate, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 245 (1977); Note, The
Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel in California: Adoption of the Sixth Amendment "Reasonably Competent Attorney" Standard, 12 Sw. U. L. REV. 53 (1980); Note, Current Standards for
Determining Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Still a Sham, Farce, or Mockery?, 1979 So. ILL. U.
L.J. 132; Comment, Defects in Ineffective Assistance Standards Used By State Courts, 50 U. COLO.
L. REV. 389 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Comment,Defects in Standards]; Comment,Liberal Review of Defense Counsel Performance: The Normal Competency test, 1976 U. ILL. L. FORUM 407:
Bamberger, Evaluating Counsel Competence, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 9, 1982, at 22, col. 2.

EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE

OF COUNSEL

States Supreme Court has come to defining a minimum standard of
competence for criminal defense counsel has been to insist that representation be "within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in
criminal cases." 5 The hollowness of the Supreme Court's standard 6 has
left the federal 7 and state8 appellate courts groping for workable standards by which to evaluate defendants' claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel. 9
This note will begin with a review of the history of the right to
effective assistance of counsel. Next, the myriad standards currently
employed by the federal and state courts in evaluating claims of the
ineffectiveness of counsel will be discussed. The various standards will
be considered in light of recent developments in the Illinois Appellate
Court,'0 the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, "
5. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).
6. The Court has never defined effective assistance of counsel as it pertains to standards of
attorney performance. This provoked a strong reaction from Justice White in Maryland v.
Marzullo:
[lit is this Court's responsibility to determine what level of competence satisfies the constitutional imperative. It also follows that we should attempt to eliminate disparities in
the minimum quality of representation required to be provided to indigent defendants.
In refusing to review a case which so clearly frames an issue that has divided the Courts
of Appeals, the Court shirks its central responsibility as the court of last resort, particularly its function in the administration of criminal justice under a Constitution such as
ours.
435 U.S. 1011, 1012-13 (1978) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). The Court's unwillingness to address this issue is particularly ironic in light of Chief Justice Burger's often quoted
criticism of the bar, that "from one-third to one-half of the lawyers who appear in the serious
cases are not really qualified to render fully adequate representation." Burger, supra note 4, at 234.
7. In Maryland v. Marzullo, Justice White said about ineffectiveness standards in the federal
courts: "Despite the clear significance of this question, the Federal Courts of Appeals are in disarray." 435 U.S. at 1011-12 (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
8. For a comprehensive listing of the myriad standards utilized by the states, see, Comment.
Defects in Standards, supra note 4, at 400-08.
9. An increasing number of aggrieved defendants are attacking their convictions on the
basis that their defense counsel was ineffective. An Illinois prisoner may seek review of his or her
conviction through four different review procedures: (1) motion for a new trial, ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38 § 116-1 (1981): (2) direct appeal ILL. REV. STAT. ch. IIOA §§ 602-608 (1981); FED. RULE
APP. P. 3-12 (3) motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to state and federal statutes authorizing collateral attack upon convictions, Illinois Post Conviction Hearing Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38 §§ 122-1 to 122-7 (1981); 28 U.S.C. § 2255; and (4) petition for a writ of habeas corpus
presented to the appropriate federal district court, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2254 (1980).
10. See People v. Henry, 103 111.App. 3d 1143, 432 N.E.2d 359 (1982); People v. Corder, 103
Ill. App. 3d 434. 431 N.E.2d 701 (1982); People v. Dowd, 101 Ill. App. 3d 830, 428 N.E.2d 894
(1981); People v. Teague, 101 11. App. 3d 993. 428 N.E.2d 1113 (1981); People v. Sturges, 101 Il.
App. 3d 962, 428 N.E.2d 1012 (1981); People v. Dean, 99 111.App. 3d 999, 426 N.E.2d 279 (1981);
People v. Watson, 98 I11.App. 3d 296, 424 N.E.2d 329 (1980); People v. Talley, 97 111.App. 3d 439,
422 N.E.2d 1084 (1981); People v. Scott, 94 Ill. App. 3d 159, 418 N.E.2d 805 (1981). See also
People v. Murphy, 72 111.2d 421, 438-39, 381 N.E.2d 677, 686 (1978) (Clark, J., specially
concurring).
I1. See United States ex rel. Cosey v. Wolff, 682 F.2d 691 (7th Cir. 1982); Wade v. Franzen,
678 F.2d 56 (7th Cir. 1982).
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and the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois 12 which may portend adoption of a new test for deciding such
cases in Illinois. Finally, this note will propose that Illinois should
adopt a standard for evaluating claims of the ineffectiveness of counsel
based upon minimum criminal defense duties suggested by the American Bar Association.13
II.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE

OF

COUNSEL IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS

Lacking a clear mandate from the Supreme Court,' 4 the federal
courts of appeals have designed disparate tests for assessing claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Beginning in the 1940's, the courts
used the "farce and mockery" test: a criminal defendant could get relief from his lawyer's failings only if counsel's incompetence was so
15
pervasive as to turn the trial into a "farce and mockery of justice."'
The realization by one commentator that the "farce and mockery"
standard was "itself a mockery of the sixth amendment,"' 16 and the
7
Supreme Court's indication that counsel's assistance must be effective'
eventually precipitated a shift away from the "farce and mockery"
standard. Eleven circuits have expressly rejected the "farce and mockery" test and have embraced a form of "reasonable competence" or
12. United States ex rel Cosey v. Wolff, 526 F. Supp. 788 (N.D. I11.1981), rev'dper curiam on
other grounds, 682 F.2d 691 (7th Cir. 1982).
13. Additional performance guidelines for criminal defense attorneys are found in ABA
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND JUDICIAL CANONS CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
(1978); NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS,
WORKING PAPERS FOR THE NCJ (1973). Id at 71. DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 3. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING
TO THE DEFENSE FUNCTION (1974) [hereinafter cited as DEFENSE STANDARDS].

14. The Supreme Court's approach to effective assistance of counsel cases is traced in THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Congressional Research Service, Library of

Congress (Jayson, ed.) U.S. Govt. Printing Office, Washington: 1973 Senate Document No. 92-82
at 1215-27.
As Justice Brennan observes, "most courts, this one included, traditionally have resisted any

realistic inquiry into the competency of trial counsel." Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72. 117
(1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). See also supra note 6.

15. Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 669 (D.C. Cir.). cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945). Diggs
alleged that he was coerced by his appointed lawyer into pleading guilty to a grand larceny
charge. He asserted that his attorney's negligence or lack of knowledge with respect to pleading
denied him effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 668.
Although Diggs was the first case to use the phrase "farce and mockery," the court cited five
Supreme Court decisions from the 1920's and 1930's in support of its assertion that -[ilt must be
shown that the proceedings were a farce and a mockery of justice." Id at 669 n.3.
16. Defective Assistance, supra note 4, at 28. See cases cited infra note 175 for examples of
gross misconduct by attorneys which has been held not to be ineffective assistance under the
"farce and mockery" standard.
17. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (dicta) (citations omitted).

EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE

OF COUNSEL

"customary skill" standard.' 8' Only the Second Circuit still employs the
"farce and mockery" approach.' 9 Even the courts using a competence
test have not established a clear line between effective and ineffective
20
assistance of counsel.
Moreover, most federal courts of appeals have held that, even if
counsel performs ineffectively, the defendant must prove that his case
was prejudiced 2' by counsel's inadequacy in order to establish an infringement of his sixth amendment rights. 22 A variety of paths have
been taken by the First, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh and District of
Columbia Circuits in handling the prejudice issue. The District of Columbia Circuit has held that "[olnce the defendant has demonstrated a
denial of effective assistance resulting in likely prejudice, the government has an opportunity to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
counsel's deficiencies were harmless. ' 23 The First, Third, Fourth and
Seventh Circuits have adopted the harmless error test espoused in
Chapman v. California.24This approach places the burden on the gov18. See United States v. DeCoster, 624 F.2d 196, 206 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en bane), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 944 (1979) ("reasonably competent attorney acting as a diligent, conscientious advocate"); United States v. Bosch, 584 F.2d 1113, 1121 (lst
Cir. 1978) ("reasonably competent assistance"); Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 736 (3d Cir. 1970) (en bane) ("the exercise of the
customary skill and knowledge which normally prevails at the time and place"); Marzullo v.
Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 543 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978) ("within the range
of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases"); Nelson v. Estelle, 642 F.2d 903, 906
(5th Cir. 1981) ("representation by an attorney reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance"); United States v. Yelardy, 567 F.2d 863, 866 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 842 (1978) ("within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases");
United States ex rel Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub noma.,
Sielaff v. Williams, 423 U.S. 876 (1975) ("an advocate whose performance meets a minimum
professional standard"); Reynolds v. Mabry, 574 F.2d 978, 981 (8th Cir. 1978) ("exercise the care
and skill of competent counsel acting under similar circumstances"); Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586
F.2d 1325, 1330 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979) ("reasonably competent attorney
acting as a diligent conscientious advocate"); Dyer v. Crisp, 613 F.2d 275, 278 (10th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 945 (1980) ("reasonably competent defense attorney"); Mylar v. Alabama, 671 F.2d 1299, 1301 (11 th Cir. 1982) ("within the range of competency generally demanded
of attorneys in criminal cases").
19. See United States v. Bubar, 567 F.2d 192, 202 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 872 (1977).
20. See Bazelon, supra note 4; Defective Assistance, supra note 4.
21. That is, defendants are required to show that the breach of the right to effective representation (e.g., failure to fully investigate the case, failure to prepare adequately for trial, or failure to
call certain witnesses) led to an unwarranted guilty verdict or an unduly harsh sentence.
22. See United States v. Hinton, 631 F.2d 769, 782-83 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Dyer v. Crisp, 613
F.2d 275, 278 (10th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 945 (1980); Word v. United States, 604
F.2d 1127, 1130 (8th Cir. 1979); Davis v. Alabama, 596 F.2d 1214, 1222 (5th Cir.), vacated, 446
U.S. 903 (1979): Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1331 (9th Ci. 1978) (en bane), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 974 (1979); United States v. Williams, 575 F.2d 388, 393 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 842 (1978); McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207, 218 (8th Cir. 1974). See also Note, Ineffective Assistance of Counse" Who Bears the Burden of Proof?., 29 BAYLOR L. REV. 29 (1977).
23. United States v. Hinton, 631 F.2d 769, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
24. 386 U.S. 18 (1967). In Chapman, the Court held that a violation of certain constitutional
guarantees, such as the sixth amendment right to counsel, would trigger automatic reversal, with-
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emnment to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a constitutional violation such as abridgment of the defendant's right to effective assistance
of counsel did not harm the defendant's case. 25 The Sixth Circuit has
held that the defendant need not demonstrate an adverse impact on his
interests, 26 and has further held that reversal is automatic upon the de27
fendant's proof of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Illinois courts have long struggled to define their ineffectiveness
standards. Recent conflicting cases have fueled the fire of controversy,
hinting that the winds of change may bring new standards.
III.

EVOLUTION OF THE ILLINOIS STANDARDS

A.

The "Farceor Sham" Test

In the 1950's, Illinois courts moved from a rule that a defendant
who employed his own lawyer could never 28 obtain relief on the
ground of his attorney's inadequacy to a position that there could be
relief under very limited circumstances. The first case to apply the new
29
test to a claimant who hired his own counsel was People v. Heirens.
out proof of prejudice. Id. at 23. However, if the government could demonstrate that a federal
constitutional error was harmless (that is, did not "contribute to the verdict obtained") beyond a
reasonable doubt, the resulting infringement of a constitutional right would not mandate reversal.
Id at 24. In Chapman, the harmless error rule was invoked when the prosecutor commented on
the failure of the defendants to testify, in violation of Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
25. See Wade v. Franzen, 678 F.2d 56, 59 (7th Cir. 1982) (by implication); United States v.
Bosch, 584 F.2d 1113, 1123 (1st Cir. 1978); United States v. Crowley, 529 F.2d 1066, 1069 (3d Cir.
1976); Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir.), cert. denied. 393 U.S. 849 (1968). See also
Hawkman v. Parratt, 661 F.2d 1161, 1169 (8th Cir. 1981); Thomas v. Wyrick, 535 F.2d 414, 416417 (8th Cir. 1976). In both Hawkman and Thomas, the Eighth Circuit approved the Chapman
test without explicitly adopting it.
26. Gilbert v. Sowders, 646 F.2d 1146, 1150 (6th Cir. 1981); Beasley v. United States, 491
F.2d 687, 695-96 (6th Cir. 1974).
In Beasley, the Sixth Circuit found that the defendant was denied effective assistance on the
ground that "[plotentially exonerating defenses were not explored by counsel and were not developed at trial." 491 F.2d at 696. The court held that the defendant need not show that he received
an unwarranted conviction or an unduly harsh sentence as a result of counsel's ineffectiveness:
Because Petitioner was represented by incompetent and ineffective counsel, his conviction cannot stand. Harmless error tests do not apply in regard to the deprivation of a
procedural right so fundamental as the effective assistance of counsel.
Id at 695-696 (citations omitted).
27. United States v. Yelardy, 567 F.2d 863, 865 n.l (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 842
(1978).
28. A search of the Illinois cases revealed that accused persons who retained their own lawyers prevailed on claims of ineffective assistance only once from the late nineteenth century
through 1966. That case is People v. Nitti, 312 111.73, 143 N.E. 448 (1924).
The prospect of obtaining post conviction relief based upon retained counsel ineffectiveness
has not improved appreciably since 1966. Only three post-1966 Illinois cases were found in which
retained counsel inadequacy was a ground of relief. See People v. Redmond, 50 111.2d 313, 278
N.E.2d 766 (1972); People v. Corder, 103 11. App. 3d 434, 431 N.E.2d 701 (1982); People v. McCoy, 80 111.App. 2d 257, 225 N.E.2d 123 (1967).
29. 4 II. 2d 131, 122 N.E.2d 231 (1954).

EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

William Heirens, a University of Chicago student was found guilty
of three murders and was sentenced to life imprisonment. During his
arrest, a Chicago police officer broke three flower pots over Heirens'
head, injuring him severely.3 0 During his second day in the hospital,
the youth was questioned all night long by police and an assistant
state's attorney. Heirens "[flailed to respond coherently, but stared
with a vacant expression and behaved in an irrational manner throughout the interrogation." 3 1 The next day, the defendant was examined by
a psychiatrist, who later testified at the post-conviction hearing 32 that
33
Heirens was suffering from a severe psychiatric disorder.
A second psychiatrist, who had never examined the youth, told
Heirens' retained lawyer that Heirens' illness did not render him unable to distinguish between right and wrong. 34 Defense counsel decided to forego a possible insanity defense, and to have his client plead
guilty in exchange for life imprisonment. The young man confessed
and pled guilty to the offenses charged, after his lawyer told him that
the death penalty would likely be imposed if he did not confess. 3 5
Before sentencing, the defendant's lawyer said to the court: "I
must confess that at this time there exists in my mind many doubts as
to this defendant's mental capacity for crime . . .[the State's Attorney
and I] agreed that any course on our part which would assist in having
[the defendant] returned to society would be. . .unfair. ' 36 In his postconviction petition, Heirens alleged that his lawyer decided not to
37
mount an insanity defense out of a misguided sense of public duty.
The Illinois Supreme Court acknowledged that the police search
of defendant's apartment, the interminable interrogation of him while
hospitalized, the unauthorized use of sodium pentothal and a lie detector during questioning "[wiere flagrant violations of his rights. ' 38 Yet,
because the behavior of the police and assistant state's attorney did not
have a substantial nexus with Heirens' guilty plea, denial of the postconviction petition was affirmed. 39 The court noted that the evidence
30. Id at 134, 122 N.E.2d at 234.
31. Id at 135, 122 N.E.2d at 236.
32. The court may hear testimony during proceedings under the Post Conviction Hearing
Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 122-6 (1981).
33. 4 I11.
2d at 136, 122 N.E.2d at 234-35.
34. Id. at 137, 122 N.E.2d at 235. The defendant's ability to distinguish between right and
wrong was the test for determining legal insanity in Illinois at the time of the Heirens case.
35. Id at 137-38, 122 N.E.2d at 235-36.
36. Id. at 140, 122 N.E.2d at 237.
37. Id. at 141, 122 N.E.2d at 237.
38. Id
39. Id. at 141-42, 122 N.E.2d at 237-38.
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suggested that Heirens was not legally responsible for his conduct at
the time of the offenses, but even if counsel erred by not preparing an
insanity defense, the mistake did not amount to ineffective representation. 40 The court then applied a new test for resolving ineffective assistance claims against retained counsel: "[m]istakes of counsel will not
amount to a denial of due process unless on the whole the representation is of such low caliber as to be equivalent to no representationat all,
and to reduce the proceedings to afarce or sham .,41
Although Heirens was unable to obtain post-conviction relief, his
case occasioned a departure from the former rule that defendants could
After
never bring claims against incompetent retained counsel.
Heirens, if a privately represented defendant could show that his trial
was reduced to a "farce or sham" by counsel's poor performance, postconviction relief might be granted.
Nonetheless, People v. Heirens clearly shows that even serious errors by counsel will not support a finding of ineffective representation
under the "farce or sham" standard. Mistakes such as failure to assert
a crucial defense do not imply inadequate assistance under the "farce
or sham" test, because the entire trial proceedings might be so poor as
to manifest no representation at all. Proving that counsel's inadequacy
made a farce or sham of the trial is almost impossible: 42 less than one
percent of defendants bringing claims of ineffectiveness of counsel in
43
Illinois between 1954 and 1983 obtained post-trial relief.
40. Id at 143, 122 N.E.2d at 238.
41. Id at 144, 122 N.E.2d at 238 (emphasis added). Although Heirens was the first time the
"farce or sham" test was applied in an Illinois case involving retained counsel, the formulation
had previously been adopted in a case where counsel was appointed. See People v. Reeves, 412
111.555, 107 N.E.2d 861 (1952).
In Reeves, appointed defense counsel neglected to (1)present to the jury a previous adjudication of insanity, (2) object to introduction in evidence of a confession obtained while the defendant was insane, (3) object to the prosecutor's statements regarding a previous conviction. Id. at
558, 107 N.E.2d at 863. Moreover, the defendant made a sworn statement that counsel did not
consult with the accused until trial day. Id at 564, 107 N.E.2d at 866. The court held that these
facts reduced the trial to a "farce and a sham" and remanded the case for further proceedings on
defendant's post-conviction petition. Id
42. The following are just a few of the many Illinois cases wherein privately represented
2d 442, 288
defendants were denied relief under the "farce or sham" test: People v. Steel, 52 I11.
N.E.2d 355 (1972); People v. Stanley, 50 111.2d 320, 278 N.E.2d 792 (1972); People v. Fleming, 50
Ill. 2d 141, 277 N.E.2d 872 (1972); People v. Nelson, 42 111.2d 172, 246 N.E.2d 244 (1969); People
v. Ortiz, 22 I11.
App. 3d 788, 317 N.E.2d 763 (1974).
43. 50 111. 2d 313, 278 N.E.2d 766 (1972). See also People v. McCoy, 80 111. App. 2d 257, 225
N.E.2d 123 (1967), where the court reversed a conviction because: (a) defendant's retained attorney introduced evidence substantially different from defendant's theory of the case; (b) defense
counsel favorably read the state's evidence to the jury and; (c) the lawyer failed to move for a
mistrial when incompetent and highly prejudicial evidence was presented to the jury. The court
employed a formulation very similar to the "farce or sham" test: counsel's performance was of
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In People v. Redmond,44 the defendant was convicted of murder,
and he appealed directly to the Illinois Supreme Court. In reviewing
the trial record, Justice Schaefer 4 5 found serious blunders by retained
trial counsel which amounted to "[a] complete failure to represent the
defendant, ' 46 reducing the trial to a "farce or sham."
First, defense counsel did not object to the prosecution's elicitation
of incompetent testimony from defendant's mother on cross-examination. 47 Second, counsel abandoned his client's defense that the killing
had been unintentional, and admitted defendant's guilt during closing
argument, although the accused had never admitted guilt in his testimony.48 The court reversed Redmond's conviction and remanded the
cause for a new trial based upon retained counsel's ineffectiveness as
49
measured by the "farce or sham" yardstick.
Thus, a privately represented defendant could obtain post trial relief based upon his lawyer's incompetence, only if he could prove that
counsel's defense amounted to no representation at all. By contrast,
Illinois courts developed a different standard for evaluating ineffectiveness of appointed counsel.
such poor quality as to "deprive the defendant of any chance of being found not guilty... [and]
amountfed] to no representation at all." Id. at 263-64, 225 N.E.2d at 126.
44. 50 111.2d 313, 278 N.E.2d 766 (1972).
45. In a 1956 law review article, Justice Schaefer had written that "[o]f all the rights that an
accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it
affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have." Schaefer, supra note 4, at 8.
46. 50 Ill. 2d at 315, 278 N.E.2d at 767.
47. Defense counsel failed to object when the State's Attorney asked the following questions
of defendant's mother:
"Do you have personal knowledge that he struck a teacher at that school?"
"Was he, in fact, expelled from that school?"
"Now, as a matter of fact this boy has always been rather lazy around the house, has he
not?"
"And, as a matter of fact, this boy was sort of shiftless, was he not?"
"Now are you going to tell the jury that you did not know about your son's conduct in
school?"
Id at 315, 278 N.E.2d at 768.
48. Counsel made these remarks during final argument:
Well, am I selling someone the defendant's guilt? I think so. Guilty, yes. Sure, guilty.
He wasn't faking when he-when he wouldn't aim that weapon at-well, Parrish [an
Assistant State's Attorney]. He wasn't kidding. That wasn't--that was inside out.
I am crying for myself. I like being in a one man office, but I am getting off the point.
You have no idea how much a win, this win, means to me because I don't think it was
murder. I will tell you what murder is. Actually, I am not real sure. I don't think
anybody is a murderer.
They asked me a hundred times what was the defense. I don't know . ..
Some of this is just to save a boy from whatever they have in store for him. And I am
not crying, he is on a murder indictment. They won't talk anything else, murder or
nothing, because that is the kind of a case we got.
Id. at 316-17. 278 N.E.2d at 768.
49. Id at 315-17, 278 N.E.2d at 768-69.
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B.

Early Approaches To Appointed Counsel Ineffectiveness

The early case of People v. Blevins 5° defined competence of counsel as "[clounsel . . .having sufficient ability and experience to fairly
represent the defendant, present his defense, and protect him from undue oppression." In Blevins, a murder conviction was reversed because
appointed counsel failed to object to incompetent, highly prejudicial
evidence of the defendant's prior criminal record. 5 1 In two similar decisions, counsel's failure to lay a proper foundation for the introduction
of crucial impeachment evidence, 52 and failure to object to prejudicial
hearsay evidence, 53 triggered reversals of convictions under the Blevins
standard.
Another approach to appointed counsel's incompetence used during the 1920's and 1930's is illustrated in People v. Francis.54 In Francis, a public defender had one five-minute consultation with his client
before trial. 55 The Illinois Supreme Court denied the defendant's ineffectiveness assistance claim, holding that "Itlhe question whether a defendant was adequately represented by able counsel must be answered
'56
solely from the circumstances of each particular case."
Another example of this approach is People v. Gardiner.57 Gardiner's appointed attorney did not object to improper cross examination and argument at trial. In reversing the conviction, the court found
that, in a close case, ineffective representation may warrant post-conviction relief.58
A growing realization that the right to effective assistance of counsel was too important to be subject to a case-by-case approach led to
dissatisfaction with the older standards. When People v. Morris59 came
before the Illinois Supreme Court in 1954, it was time for a change, and
50. 251 I1. 381,390, 96 N.E. 214, 218 (1911).
51. Id
52. People v. Schulman, 299 111.125, 132 N.E. 530 (1921).
53. People v. Winchester, 352 111.237, 185 N.E. 580 (1933).
54. 356 Ill.
74, 190 N.E. 106 (1934).
55. Id at 76-77, 190 N.E. at 107.
56. Id at 77, 190 N.E. at 107.
57. 303 111.204, 135 N.E. 422 (1922).
58. The court articulated its rule as follows:
The fact that a person charged with a crime is poorly defended will not justify a reversal
of the judgment where it is reasonably supported by the evidence ...,but where the
evidence is close, as it is in this case, and it is clear that the prosecuting attorney has
taken advantage of the accused because he was poorly represented, and the trial court
has permitted such advantage to be taken, then we will consider the errors, notwithstanding the failure to properly preserve the questions for review.
Id at 206-07, 135 N.E. at 423.
59. 3 Il. 2d 437, 121 N.E.2d 810 (1954).
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the modern-day standard for evaluating appointed counsel ineffectiveness was born.
C.

The 'Actual Incompetence" Standard

The court in Morris noted that many early ineffectiveness cases
were direct appeals, and that the decisions did not rest on constitutional
grounds. By contrast, recent ineffectiveness cases had been decided
"[in relation to the expanding concept of due process of law under the
fourteenth amendment." 60 Because violation of a constitutional right is
involved, claims of incompetence of counsel were now being raised
more often in collateral proceedings under the Post Conviction Hearing
Act. 6 ' Yet, the Morris court said that, because the federal courts did
not clarify the mandate of federal due process in this area, "[it is difficult to formulate a standard by which this type of case can be
'62
judged.
Sensing the need to establish a new standard for deciding appointed counsel cases, the Morris court said:
[I]n order to [receive relief based upon ineffective assistance of appointed counsel] the defendant must clearly establish: (1) actual incompetency of counsel, as reflected by the manner of carrying out his
duties as a trial attorney; and (2) substantial prejudice resulting
therefrom,63 without which the outcome would probably have been
different.
Applying the new test, the court reversed Morris' convictions for
assault to commit robbery and assault to commit murder. The Morris
court found that the following actions by the public defender amounted
to ineffective assistance of counsel:
(1) Before trial, the defendant was entitled to be discharged for
want of prosecution pursuant to the speedy trial statute. 64 Counsel was
apparently unaware of this statutory provision, however, and he failed
to examine available records to ascertain the length of Morris' pretrial
confinement. 6 5 Consequently, the public defender did not make the
appropriate motion for discharge before trial.
(2) Counsel spoke with the defendant only once-on the day of
60. Id at 448, 121 N.E.2d at 817.
61. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 122-1 to 122-7 (1981).
62. People v. Morris, 3 Il1. 2d 437, 449, 121 N.E.2d 810, 817 (1954).
63. Id. The Morris court's standard set forth in the text will hereinafter be referred to as the
"actual incompetence" standard.
64. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 748 (1951). Morris had been held in continuous custody for
more than four months before trial, in violation of the statute.
65. 3 Ill. 2d at 452-53, 121 N.E.2d at 819.
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trial. 66
(3) Counsel never discussed the merits of the case with Morris.
When asked for advice on selection of a jury or bench trial, the public
'67
defender replied, "It's up to you."
(4) Defense counsel told Morris on the day of trial that "every68
thing was useless" and did not offer a plan for defending the case.
The court held that the public defender's ignorance of a criminal
statute which had long been on the books in some form coupled with
"meagre preparation and scant attention to the case" amounted to "actual incompetence. '69 The court found "substantial prejudice ...
without which the result would probably have been different"; specifically, Morris would have been entitled to his release prior to trial if the
public defender had made the appropriate motion for discharge. 70 Despite the public defender's errors, Morris probably would not have secured reversal of his convictions if he were represented by counsel of
his own choice, because there was no showing that the trial itself was
'7 1
reduced to a "farce or sham."
Defendants seeking 'relief from ineffective appointed counsel
under the "actual incompetence" standard bear a heavy burden. Actual incompetence may be shown by, for example, a failure to conduct
an investigation and interview witnesses, 72 but showing extreme deriliction on the part of counsel is necessary to meet the requirement of
"substantial prejudice . . . without which the result would probably
73
have been different."
Two examples of substantial prejudice under the "actual incompetency" test illuminate the burden defendants confront. As shown
above, the claimant in Morris was required to show that he would
66. Id at 450, 121 N.E.2d at 818.
67. Id at 452, 121 N.E.2d at 818.
68. Id at 452, 121 N.E.2d at 819.
69. Id at 452-53, 121 N.E.2d at 819.
70. Id The court noted that Morris' co-defendant was discharged under the statute. 3 i11. 2d
at 453, 121 N.E.2d 819.
71. The "farce or sham" test is used to determine retained counsel ineffectiveness. See supra
text accompanying notes 29-49.
72. People v. Stepheny, 46 111.2d 153, 263 N.E.2d 83 (1970).
73. The burden confronting defendants under the "actual incompetence" test is illustrated by
the fact that, out of approximately 100 Illinois cases decided between 1954 and 1983 in which the
"actual incompetence" test was applied to appointed counsel ineffectiveness, claimants were
granted relief in only 4 cases. See People v. Stepheny, 46 111.2d 153, 263 N.E.2d 83 (1970) (defendant entitled to evidentiary hearing on adequacy of representation); People v. Morris, 3 Ill. 2d
437, 121 N.E.2d 810 (1954) (conviction reversed; case remanded for new trial); People v. Ford, 99
Ill. App. 3d 973, 246 N.E.2d 340 (1981) (case remanded for evidentiary hearing on ineffective
representation); People v. Clark, 42 II. App. 3d 472, 355 N.E.2d 619 (1976) (conviction reversed;
case remanded for new trial).
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never have been tried for two felony offenses if his lawyer had made
the appropriate motion for discharge.
Another example is People v. Stepheny, 74 where the defendant met
the substantial prejudice requirement by showing that (1) without his
consent, his lawyer argued that he was guilty during opening and closing statements, and (2) his attorney failed to locate and interview key
witnesses who would have largely corroborated defendant's testimony. 75 During opening and closing statements, Stepheny's attorney
remarked: "[I1f there is a finding of guilty, . . . probably this Court
can find [the defendant] guilty of a lesser charge . . . . I respectfully
submit that this is what I believe would serve the ends of Justice in this
case."' 1 6 Nevertheless, the bevy of cases in which defendants have been
unable to meet the "substantial prejudice" burden attest to the stringent
77
nature of the "actual incompetence" formulation.
Courts and commentators have vigorously attacked the rationale
underlying the use in Illinois of separate standards for appointed and
retained counsel inadequacy. Not only do separate standards exist in
Illinois, but also the several districts of the Illinois Appellate Court do
not agree on the proper application of the standards. Some recent cases
may indicate a trend against use of the archaic "farce or sham" test, but
this test prevails as the measure of incompetency of retained counsel in
Illinois.
IV.

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN ILLINOIS:

THE

CURRENT DEBATE

A.

The Dual Standardand the Inadequacy
of the "Farceor Sham" Test

The Illinois courts use different standards for evaluating claims of
ineffectiveness depending upon whether defense counsel is retained or
appointed. If counsel is retained, the "farce or sham" standard applies. 78 By contrast, if counsel is appointed, the defendant may be enti74. 46 Ill.
2d 153, 263 N.E.2d 83 (1970).
75. Id at 154, 158, 263 N.E.2d 84, 86.
76. Id at 154, 263 N.E.2d at 84.
77. See, e.g., People v. Haywood, 82 Il1.2d 540, 413 N.E.2d 410 (1980); People v. Carlson, 79
Ill. 2d 564, 404 N.E.2d 233 (1980); People v. Greer, 79 111. 2d 103, 402 N.E.2d 203 (1980); People v.
Hills, 78 I1. 2d 500, 401 N.E.2d 523 (1980); People v. Witherspoon, 55 111.
2d 18, 302 N.E.2d 3
(1973); People v. Goerger, 52 Ill. 2d 430, 288 N.E.2d 416 (1972); People v. Thomas, 51 111. 2d 39,
280 N.E.2d 433 (1972); People v. Newell, 48 Ill. 2d 382, 268 N.E.2d 17 (1971): People v. Hrebenar,
48 111.
2d 100, 268 N.E.2d 869 (1971).
78. People v. Murphy, 72 111.
2d 421, 436, 381 N.E.2d 677, 685 (1978) (quoting People v.
Torres, 54 111. 2d 384. 391, 297 N.E.2d 142, 146 (1973)); accord People v. Heirens, 4 111. 2d 131, 122
N.E.2d 231 (1954).
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tied to post-conviction relief if his lawyer was "[aictually incompetent,
, and if this incompetence produced substantial prejudice to the
defendant without which the result of the trial would probably have
79
been different."
Illinois courts have justified the use of the "farce or sham" standard on the ground that any other test would foster feigned incompetence.80 The courts further justify the burden on the grounds that most
such claims are frivolous, 8I and that most convicts are "guilty
anyhow.

82

The "guilty anyhow" attitude permits constitutional violations unless the victims prove their innocence. This attitude fosters inadequate
criminal defense by encouraging judicial blindness 83 to ineffective
assistance in cases in which the defendant is unable to make a colorable
showing of innocence. 84 Widespread judicial belief that most defend79. People v. Greer, 79 Il. 2d 103. 120-21, 402 N.E.2d 203, 211 (1980); accord People v.
2d 305, 263 N.E.2d I
Goerger, 52 111.2d 403, 288 N.E.2d 416 (1972); People v. Dudley, 46 111.
2d 437.
2d 165, 230 N.E.2d 851 (1967); People v. Morris, 3 Ill.
(1970); People v. Georgev, 38 111.
121 N.E.2d 810 (1954).
80. "Any other rule would put a premium upon pretended incompetence of counsel, for if the
rule were otherwise a lawyer with a desperate case would have only to neglect it in order to insure
reversal or vacation of the conviction." People v. Stephens, 6 Ill.
2d 257, 259, 128 N.E.2d 731, 732
(1955); accord People v. Heirens, 4 111. 2d 131, 144, 122 N.E.2d 231, 238 (1954); People v. Mitchell,
App. 3d 788,
411 111.407. 104 N.E.2d 285, cert. denied, 343 U.S. 969 (1952); People v. Ortiz, 22 111.
799, 317 N.E.2d 763, 768 (1974). The notion is that if a more liberal standard of review existed for
retained counsel cases, counsel would employ substandard representation as a trial strategy in
order to obtain the release of patently guilty clients.
81. Under the "farce or sham" test, a defendant must prove essentially that his representation
was so poor that he would have been better off defending the case pro se. Grevious errors by
counsel will not support post-conviction relief unless the entireproceedings are reduced to a farce.
See. e.g., Diggs v. Welch. 148 F.2d 667, 669 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945). In
Diggs, the court said:
Itiswell known that the drafting of petitions for habeas corpus has become a game in
many penal institutions. Convicts are not subject to the deterrents of prosecution for
perjury and contempt of court which affect ordinary litigants. The opportunity to try his
former lawyer has its undoubted attraction to a disappointed prisoner . . . . He may
realize that his allegations will not be believed, but the relief from monotony offered by a
hearing in court is well worth the trouble of writing them down.
148 F.2d at 669-70. See generallr Grano, supra note 4. at 1243.
82. See Bazelon. supra note 4. at 825: Bines, supra note 4, at 962-64. See. e.g.. People v.
Schulman, 299 Ill. 125, 132 N.E. 530 (1921). Courts have also justified the "farce or sham" test by
2d
saying that the test fosters more careful selection of attorneys. See. e.g.. People v. Cox, 12 I11.
265, 146 N.E.2d 19 (1957).
83. See. e.g.. Friendly. supra note 4. Judge Friendly believes that our system, which allows
numerous appeals in addition to collateral proceedings, is abused by prisoners, wastes precious
judicial resources and fosters public disrespect for the judgments of our criminal courts. Id. at
148-50. The thesis of his article is that "convictions should be subject to collateral attack only
when the prisoner supplements his constitutional plea with a colorable claim of innocence." Id at
142.
84. In a "guilty anyhow" case, the defense attorney and, perhaps, the judge believe that the
defendant is obviously guilty of the offense charged. Judge Bazelon has forcefully decried the
"guilty anyhow" attitude:
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ants are "guilty anyhow" 85 clearly violates established constitutional
principles. Moreover, the "guilty anyhow" attitude undermines the
traditional presumption of a criminal defendant's innocence. Of
course, defendants do not need to prove their innocence in American
courts; instead, the government must prove each element of an offense
86
beyond a reasonable doubt.
The "farce or sham" test, by requiring the defendant to show that
his legal assistance was tantamount to no representation and that the
entire proceedings amounted to a mockery of justice, violates the rule
of Chapman v. California.87 Chapman held that the state must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that violations of a defendant's rights are
harmless. By contrast, under the "farce or sham" test, the defendant
must show not only that he was harmed by ineffective representation,
but also that counsel's performance was so poor that the entire proPerhaps counsel concluded from this limited information that his client had no alibi
defense and was guilty, and that therefore counsel was excused from conducting any
investigation. But the suggestion that a client whose lawyer believes him to be guilty
deserves less pretrial investigation is simply wrong. An attorney's duty to investigate is
not relieved by his own perception of his client's guilt or innocence. I can think of nothing more destructive of the adversary system than to excuse inadequate investigation on
the grounds that defense counsel-the accused's only ally in the entire proceedingsdisbelieved his client and therefore thought that further inquiry would prove fruitless.
The Constitutionentitles a criminal defendant to a trial in court by ajury of his peers---not
to a trial by his court-appointeddefense counsel.
United States v. DeCoster, 624 F.2d 196, 283-84 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
944 (1979) (Bazelon, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
85. See Bines, supra note 4, at 962. See also Defective Assistance, supra note 4; Friendly,
supra note 4.
Some researchers have suggested that judges may be justified in believing that most defendants who go to trial are "guilty anyhow." VERA INSTITUTE, FELONY ARRESTS (lst rev. ed. 1981);
H. JACOB, JUSTICE IN AMERICA: COURTS, LAWYERS AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (3d ed. 1978)
[hereinafter cited as JACOB]: C. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1978): J.
EISENSTEIN & H. JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE, (2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as EISENSTEIN]; B.
FARST, J. LUCIANOVIC & S.J. COX, WHAT HAPPENS AFTER ARREST?: A COURT PERSPECTIVE OF
POLICE OPERATIONS IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (1977); Lecture by Professor Michael G.
Maxfield, Northwestern University Political Science Department (October 18, 1978).
Professor Jacob's study of the disposition of felony arrests in Baltimore, Chicago, and Detroit
indicates that only a small percentage of felony arrestees are ever convicted or sentenced to prison.
JACOB, supra, at 182. In Chicago, 66% of felony arrestees in 1972 had all charges against them
dismissed. EISENSTEIN, supra, at 191. Only 25% of all felony arrestees were convicted, and only
15% were incarcerated. JACOB, supra, at 182. Professors Eisenstein and Jacob report similar findings in Baltimore, Detroit, Washington, D.C., Los Angeles, and San Diego. EISENSTEIN, supra, at
191: JACOB. supra, at 182.
The authors point out that the vast majority of felony charges are dismissed prior to trial
because prosecutors determine that corroborative physical evidence or inculpatory testimony is
lacking. Therefore, felony arrestees have myriad opportunities between arrest and incarceration
to drop out of the felony justice system. Accordingly, the Vera Institute researchers, as well as
Professors Maxfield. Forst, and Silberman, conclude that the relatively small number of felony
arrestees who remain in the system all the way through arrest, trial, conviction and imprisonment
are truly guilty of the offenses charged.
86. In re Winship. 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970).
87. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
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ceedings were reduced to a farce. It is very difficult for a defendant to
prove that his lawyer provided no representation and that the entire
trial proceedings were reduced to a farce by counsel's performance. In
jurisdictions using the "farce or sham" standard, few convictions have
88
been reversed due to ineffective assistance of counsel.
Further, to assert, as many have, that the "farce or sham" test must
be retained in Illinois because counsel may feign incompetence in order
to assure reversal of an anticipated conviction. 89 Attorneys know of the
likelihood of a besmirched reputation and of sanctions 90 imposed by
the Illinois Supreme Court Attorney Registration and Disciplinary
88. In Illinois, the following cases have granted relief to aggrieved defendants under the
2d 313, 278 N.E.2d 766 (1972)
"farce or sham" test or a similar test: People v. Redmond, 50 111.
("farce or sham" test; retained counsel; attorney allowed the prosecutor to disparage defendant's
character without objection and admitted his client's guilt during closing argument); cf. People v.
Carter. 41 111. App. 3d 425, 354 N.E.2d 482 (1976) ("no representation at all" test; lawyer admitted
defendant's guilt during closing argument and failed to take advantage of a police officer's omisApp. 2d 257, 225 N.E.2d 123 (1967) ("no
sion of Miranda warnings); People v. McCoy, 80 111.
representation at all--deprived defendant of any chance of being found not guilty" test: retained
counsel: attorney abandoned defendant's theory of the case and permitted jury to hear inadmissi555, 107 N.E.2d 861 (1952) ("farce or
ble. highly prejudicial evidence); People v. Reeves, 412 111.
sham" test used for first time in Illinois; appointed counsel: attorney failed to present evidence of a
previous adjudication of insanity and did not object to highly prejudicial, incompetent evidence);
People v. DeSimone, 9 111.2d 522, 138 N.E.2d 556 (1956) ("farce or sham" test; appointed counsel:
attorneys did not understand how to mount an insanity defense, made no objections during the
trial which consumed 2,250 pages of transcript, and asked markedly bizzare questions of prospective jurors during voir dire).
The following authorities from other jurisdictions underscore the difficulty in mounting an
ineffectiveness claim against the "farce or sham" test: United States v. Katz, 425 F.2d 928 (2d Cir.
1970) (no reversal even though defense counsel expressed unhappiness over having the case, and
was observed sleeping during witness examination); Butler v. United States, 260 F.2d 574 (4th Cir.
1958) (no reversal even though retained counsel was under indictment for a drug offense and
under treatment for addiction): Hudspeth v. McDonald, 120 F.2d 962 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 314
U.S. 617 (1941) (no reversal where defense counsel was allegedly drinking heavily during trial):
Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d (6th Cir. 1974) (no reversal where defense counsel displayed
bizarre courtroom behavior); Brown v. Swenson, 487 F.2d 1236 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied. 416
U.S. 944 (1974) (no ineffectiveness even though defendant's guilty plea led to twenty-five year
sentence when he should have received no more than five years): Daughtery v. Beto, 388 F.2d 810
(5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied. 393 U.S. 986 (1968) (no reversal where counsel failed to raise only
available defense and only consulted with defendant fifteen minutes before trial). See also SatilIan v. State, 470 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (ignorance of the applicable law does not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel).
89. See. e.g.. authorities cited infra note 142.
90. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 1A,§ 771 (1981) Ihereinafter cited as Rule 7711 provides:
Conduct of attorneys which violates the Code of Professional Responsibility contained
in article VIII of these rules or which tends to defeat the administration of justice or to
bring the courts or the legal profession into disrepute shall be grounds for discipline by
the court. Discipline of attorneys may be:
(a) disbarment:
(b) disbarment on consent:
(c) suspension for a specified period and until further order of court:
(d) suspension for a specified period of time:
(e) suspension until further order of the court: or
(f) censure.
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Commission.9' As one court has stated: "[a]ttorneys generally are
greatly concerned with their professional reputations. They know that
to lose a good reputation for faithful adherence to the cause of their
client is not only to lose that which they should most highly treasure,
92
but is to lose their practice as well."
Moreover, if the pretended incompetence fails to fool the court,
and the case proceeds to verdict, counsel's intentional errors 93 are likely
to have stripped away any hint of a meritorious defense. 94 Accordingly
the accused may receive a harsher sentence, because his defense was
not properly presented. 95 In addition, it is unlikely that attorneys will
take these risks, 96 because many criminal lawyers appear before a particular judge more than once and, thus, do not want to bias a judge
against them.
91. In addition to violating Rule 771, supra note 90, feigned incompetence may violate the
following disciplinary rules set forth in the Code of Professional Responsibility:
(1) Canon 7 requires that an attorney represent a client zealously within the bounds of the
law. Rule 7-101 provides that:
(1) A lawyer shall not intentionally
(I) fail to seek the lawful objectives of his client through reasonably available
means permitted by law and the disciplinary rules...
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I IOA foil. § 771, Canon 7, Rule 7-101 (1981).
(2) Canon 6 commands that a lawyer should represent a client competently. Rule 6-101,
entitled "Failing to Act Competently" provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not
(I) handle a legal matter which he knows or should know that he is not competent
to handle, ...
(2) handle a legal matter without preparation adequate in the circumstances;or
(3) neglect a legal matter entrusted to him.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. IIOA, foil. § 771, Canon 6, Rule 6-101 (1981) (emphasis added).
(3) Canon I states that a lawyer should assist in maintaining the integrity and competence
of the legal profession. Rule 1-102 makes a lawyer subject to discipline for violation of disciplinary rules as well as for behavior involving "dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation." ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. IIOA, foil. § 771, Canon 1,Rule 1-102 (1981).
(4) Rule 7-102 provides in part:
(a) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not
(5) knowingly make a false statement of law or fact:
(7) counsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to
be illegal or fraudulent; or
(8) knowingly engage in other illegal conduct or conduct contrary to a
disciplinary rule.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. IIOA, foil. § 771, Canon 7, Rule 7-102(a)(5), (7), (8) (1981).
92. Williams v. Beto, 354 F.2d 698, 706 (5th Cir. 1965). See also Bines, supra note 4, at 940;
Waltz, supra note 4,at 313; Ineffective Representation, supra note 4, at 32.
93. The gross ineffectiveness of counsel exhibited in People v. DeSimone, 9 111.
2d 522, 138
N.E.2d 556 (1956), has been referred to as pretended incompetence. See United States ex re.
Maselli v. Reincke, 383 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1967); Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel, 49 VA. L.
REV. 1531, 1541 (1963).
94. The DeSimone brothers had a colorable insanity defense. Id. at 526-27, 138 N.E.2d at
558.
95. One of the DeSimone defendants received the death penalty, the other defendant was
sentenced to forty years imprisonment. Id. at 523, 138 N.E.2d at 557.
96. See, e.g.. United States ex rel. Maselli v.Reincke, 383 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1967).
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Furthermore, the "farce or sham" test will not dissuade lawyers
who try to deceive the court. Even if feigned ineffectiveness could be
deterred by the "farce or sham" standard, it is inequitable to apply this
97
test to retained counsel only.
98
In light of the Supreme Court's holdings in Gideon v. Wainwright
and McMann v. Richardson,99 the "farce or sham" standard fails to adhere to sixth amendment requirements.' 00 First, "[tJhe mockery test requires such a minimal level of performance from counsel that it is itself
a mockery of the sixth amendment."'' ° Second the "farce or sham"
formulation should be an embarrassment to the legal profession itself,
because attorneys and judges require more than a "farce or sham"
standard of care in other professions, such as medicine.10 2 Third, the
"farce or sham" standard's focus on the trial proceedings 10 3 is too narrow. Much criminal defense work is done before trial.' °4 Consequently, counsel's ineffectiveness may not appear in the trial court
record,10 5 and so counsel's mistakes may be disregarded. Finally, the
97. Grano, supra note 4, at 1244.
98. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
99. 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).
has
100. The Court in McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14 (1970) stated that "[ilt
long been recognized that the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel...
(citations omitted) icounsel's performance must be] within the range of competence demanded of
attorneys in criminal cases." The requirements of the "farce or sham" test fall far below the
Supreme Court mandate of McMann. The "farce or sham" standard requires only that counsel's
performance not be so wretched as to amount to no representation at all. As long as counsel's
mistakes are not so outrageous as to reduce the entire proceedings to a mockery of justice, the
requirements of the "farce or sham" test are met.
A shocking example of what it takes to establish ineffective assistance of counsel under the
"farce or sham" test is presented by Cooks v. United States, 461 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1972). In
Cooks, defendant's attorney advised his client to agree to a sentence six times longer than he
could receive as a matter of law. Id. at 532. Under this extreme circumstance, the accused was
able to show ineffective representation.
101. Defective Assistance, supra note 4, at 28.
102. Bines, supra note 4, at 928.
103. See, e.g., People v. Steel, 52 111.2d 442, 288 N.E.2d 355 (1972); People v. Stanley, 50 Ill.
2d 320, 278 N.E.2d 792 (1972); People v. Fleming, 50 111.2d 141, 277 N.E.2d 872 (1972); People v.
Nelson, 42 111.2d 172, 246 N.E.2d 244 (1969).
104. Defense counsel's role in crucial decisions such as (1)entry of plea; (2) waiver of jury
trial; (3) whether to rest at the conclusion of the government's evidence or present a defense case;
and (4) whether the defendant should testify transpires outside the trial record. See DEFENSE
STANDARDS, supra note 13, at §§ 4.1, 5.2 and 6.1.

105. In Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978). the Court faced a claim of counsel ineffectiveness due to joint representation of conflicting interests. The Court stated that it is important to
assess counsel's performance:
not only at trial but also as to possible pretrial plea negotiations and in the sentencing
process. It may be possible in some cases to identify from the record the prejudice resulting from an attorney's failure to undertake certain trial tasks, but even with a record of
the sentencing hearing available itwould be difficult to judge intelligently the impact of
a conflict on the attorney's representation of a client. And to assess the impact of a
conflict of interests on the attorney's options, tactics, and decisions in plea negotiations
would be virtually impossible.
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"farce or sham" test provides no guidance for the bench or bar. 0
B.

6

Current Disarray In Illinois Courts Over the Applicable Standard

The Illinois Supreme Court has repeatedly held that different tests
should be used to assess defense counsel's competency, according to
whether counsel is retained or appointed. Nevertheless, recent Illinois
Appellate Court decisions reveal confusion among the courts about
what standard to apply. The turmoil is manifest in four types of misapplication of the Illinois standards for ineffective assistance:
10 7
(1) Applying both standards in one case.
(2) Holding that the "farce or sham" standard applies to both
appointed and retained counsel.' 0 8
(3) Applying the "actual incompetence" test to retained counsel
after holding that the "farce or sham" test applies to both appointed
and retained counsel. 0 9
(4) Applying the "actual incompetence" standard, but holding
that there could be no reversal unless counsel's efforts amounted to no
representation at all. '10
In People v. Brent,"' the defendant alleged ineffective assistance,
because his retained lawyer failed to make timely objections. 1 2 The
Brent court cited two cases for the proposition that the Illinois
Supreme Court uses the "actual incompetence" test to assess incompetence of retained counsel.' ' 3 Yet, the court did not discuss a long line
of Illinois Supreme Court authority to the effect that the test for reid at 490-91.
106. "There are no tests by which it can be determined how many errors an attorney may
make before his batting average becomes so low as to make his representation ineffective." Diggs
v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 670 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945). See People v. Ortiz, 22
Ill. App. 3d 788, 795, 317 N.E.2d 763, 768 (1974) ("No test can be formulated which will, in
advance of close scrutiny of the trial record . . . furnish a definite checklist of what is needed to
sustain a defendant's assertion of constitutional deprivation of effective assistance of counsel.").
107. People v. Teague, 101 111.App. 3d 193, 428 N.E.2d 1113 (1981): People v. Ferguson, 99
Ill. App. 3d 779, 425 N.E.2d 582 (1981); People v. Johnson, 98 111.App. 3d 228, 424 N.E.2d 610
(1981); People v, Puckett, 70 111. App. 3d 743, 388 N.E.2d 1293 (1979): People v. Brent, 56 Ill. App.
3d 661, 371 N.E.2d 1245 (1978).
108. People v. Shestuik, 59 11.App. 3d 296, 376 N.E.2d 56 (1978) People v. Virgil, 54 111.App.
3d 682, 370 N.E.2d 74 (1977); People v. Hawkins, 23 111. App. 3d 758, 320 N.E.2d 90 (1974): People
v. Ortiz. 22 111.App. 3d 788, 317 N.E.2d 763 (1974); People v. Long, 12 Ill. App. 3d 974, 298
N.E.2d 784 (1973).
109. People v. Virgil, 54 111.App. 3d 682, 370 N.E.2d 74 (1977).
110. People v. Clark, 47 Ill. App. 3d 624, 365 N.E.2d 20 (1977).
Ill. 56 111.App. 3d 661, 371 N.E.2d 1245 (1978).
112. Id at 666, 371 N.E.2d at 1248.
113. Id (citing People v. Gill, 54 111. 2d 357, 297 N.E.2d 135 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1144
(1974); People v. Harper, 43 111.2d 368, 253 N.E.2d 451 (1969)).
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tained counsel's ineffectiveness is "farce or sham". 1 4 Furthermore, the
court indicated that the First District does not follow the Illinois
Supreme Court mandate: the First District standard is "farce or sham"
for both retained and appointed counsel." 15 The court apparently was
16
uncertain about which standard to apply, so they used both tests."
Two kindred cases are People v. Ferguson 117 and People v. Johnson."t 8 Both of the defendants were represented by appointed counsel,
and both ineffectiveness claims failed. The court in Ferguson evaluated
the defendant's allegation that his attorney's misfeasance resulted in
the exclusion of a key alibi witness under both tests. "19 In Johnson, the
Third District again applied both of the Illinois standards, this time to
an allegation of incompetence based on inadequate trial preparation
20
and imprudent trial tactics.1
The First District Illinois Appellate Court has issued many recent
decisions improperly holding that the "farce or sham" formulation applies to incompetence of appointed, as well as retained counsel. 12 '
Three cases highlight the confusion in the intermediate appellate
courts, because they involve retained defense counsel. Despite the tumult in Illinois courts over ineffectiveness standards, there has been
little doubt, at least since People v. Heirens,12 2 that the "farce or sham"
test applies to retained counsel. Therefore, the courts in People v. Shestuik, 23 People v. Virgil 124 and People v. Hawkins 12 5 had no reason to
address which standard applies to appointed attorneys.
In Virgil, a man appealed his armed robbery conviction, alleging
that his retained attorney mishandled the alibi defense, failed to elicit
medical testimony regarding the accused's physical ailments, and failed
114. See, e.g., People v. Torres, 54 111. 2d 384, 297 N.E.2d 142 (1973); People v. Redmond, 50
111.2d 313, 278 N.E.2d 766 (1972); People v. Washington, 41 111. 2d 16, 241 N.E.2d 425 (1968);
People v. Heirens, 4 Il. 2d 131, 122 N.E.2d 231 (1954).
115. 56 Ill. App. 3d at 666, 371 N.E.2d at 1248.
116. The Brent court said:
Considering the entire record in this case, it cannot be said that the outcome would
probably have been different had defense counsel made all of the proper and timely
objections, nor can it be said the proceedings were reduced to a sham or a farce by
counsel's conduct.
Id.
117. 99 Ill. App. 3d 779, 425 N.E.2d 582 (1981).
118. 98 111.App. 3d 228, 424 N.E.2d 610 (1981).
119. 99 111.App. 3d at 785-86, 425 N.E.2d at 585-86.
120. 98 111.App. 3d at 230-31, 424 N.E.2d at 613-14.
121. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 180.
122. 4 II. 2d 131, 122 N.E.2d 231 (1954) (first Illinois case to apply "farce or sham" test to
retained lawyers).
123. 59 111.App. 3d 296, 376 N.E.2d 56 (1978).
124. 54 I1. App. 3d 682, 370 N.E.2d 74 (1977).
125. 23 I11.App. 3d 758, 320 N.E.2d 90 (1974).
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to object to evidence of prior criminal activity. The court turned aside
Virgil's contentions, holding that the "farce or sham" test applies
equally to appointed and retained lawyers, and that counsel's miscues
were not so grave as to reduce the trial to a farce. Strangely enough, a
few sentences after the court had announced the dual applicability of
the "farce or sham" standard, the court declared that the "actual in1 26
competence" test applied to the case.
People v. Clark 127 presents a variant of the "mixing and matching"
of standards demonstrated in Virgil. Clark contended that his appointed lawyer (1) moved to strike testimony favorable to the defense;
(2) prompted an identification of the accused during cross-examination
of a witness who had made no identification on direct exam; (3) failed
to adequately cross-examine the government's witnesses; and (4) ineffectively examined another witness regarding competency. The court
affirmed Clark's conviction, holding that he failed to prove that his attorney was actually incompetent. 28 Yet, a few paragraphs later, the
29
court intoned that the "farce or sham" test governed the case.
Illinois' dual standard has brought about judicial anarchy in the
law of ineffective assistance. The districts of the Illinois Appellate
Court have taken their own positions on the issue, sometimes in direct
conflict with Illinois Supreme Court decisions. Many recent Illinois
decisions have either imposed new requirements on ineffective assistance cases 130 or announced the adoption of a new standard in an appellate district. 131
The right to effective trial representation in criminal cases is too
vital to be applied and interpreted inconsistently among the appellate
126. 54 111.App. 3d at 686-87, 370 N.E.2d at 77-78.
127. 47 Ill. App. 3d 624, 365 N.E.2d 20 (1977).
128. Id. at 630, 365 N.E.2d at 26.
129. The court said, "It is only where such legal assistance amounts to no representation at all
that the constitutional requirement will demand reversal." Id (citations omitted) (emphasis
added).
130. See, e.g., People v. Reynolds, 105 Ill. App. 3d 698, 701-02, 434 N.E.2d 776, 778 (1982)
(defendant must "clearly establish" actual incompetence of counsel and resultant prejudice); People v. Bynum, 102 Ill. App. 3d 461, 467, 430 N.E.2d 110, 114 (1981) (ineffective assistance of
counsel can be shown only by "strong and convincing" proof).
131. See, e.g., People v. Corder, 103 111. App. 3d 434, 437, 431 N.E.2d 701, 704 (1982) (Third
District abandoned dual standard and adopted "actual incompetence" as standard for both appointed and retained counsel); accord People v. Talley, 97 Ill. App. 3d 439, 443, 422 N.E.2d 1084,
1087-88 (1st Dist. 1981); People v. Scott, 94 Ill. App. 3d 159, 163-64, 418 N.E.2d 805, 808 (5th Dist.
1981). But cf. People v. Malley, 103 Ill. App. 3d 534, 537, 431 N.E.2d 708, 711 (3d Dist. 1982)

(Justice Barry, who had concurred without opinion in Corder two days earlier, wrote that "[in
order to show ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must demonstrate that counsel neglected to do something he should have done and that the defendant was thereby prejudiced.")
(citations omitted).
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courts in Illinois. The contours of the right should not vary according
to the location of arrest. A few Illinois courts have recently attempted
to remove the chaos by discarding the "farce or sham" test and applying the "actual incompetency" test to retained as well as appointed
counsel.
C. Abolition of the Dual Standardand the "'Farceor Sham" Test
In People v. Scott,132 the Fifth District reviewed the dual standard
for evaluating ineffectiveness claims. The Scott court noted that the
33
United States Supreme Court had recently held in Cuyler v. Sullivan 1
that no distinction should be drawn between retained and appointed
counsel for the purpose of determining ineffectiveness. The Fifth District in Scott adopted the rationale of Cuyler' 34 and held that the
double standard used in Illinois "[i]s now impermissible by reason of
135
the decision in Cuyler."'
Similarly, the First District in People v. Talley 136 noted that the
Illinois Supreme Court had not yet evaluated the double standard in
light of Cuyler. 137 The Talley court adopted the rule of Scott: only the
"actual incompetency" standard should be applied to all cases.' 38 Five
more recent cases 139 have followed Scott and Talley in abolishing the
132. 94 Ill. App. 3d 159, 418 N.E.2d 805 (1981).
133. 446 U.S. 335, 334 (1980). See also Morris v. Slappy, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 1618 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in the result). Cuyler dealt with an allegation of counsel ineffectiveness based
upon a conflict of interest, a topic which is beyond the scope of this article.
134. The Cuyler Court said:
A proper respect for the Sixth Amendment disarms petitioner's contention that defendants who retain their own lawyers are entitled to less protection than defendants for
whom the State appoints counsel. We may assume with confidence that most counsel,
whether retained or appointed, will protect the rights of an accused. But experience
teaches that, in some cases, retained counsel will not provide adequate representation.
The vital guarantee of the Sixth Amendment would stand for little if the often uninformed decision to retain a particular lawyer could reduce or forfeit the defendant's
entitlement to constitutional protection. Since the State's conduct of a criminal trial itself implicates the State in the defendant's conviction, we see no basis for drawing a
distinction between retained and appointed counsel that would deny equal justice to
defendants who must choose their own lawyers.
Id
135. People v. Scott, 94 IlI. App. 3d 159, 163-64, 418 N.E.2d 805, 808 (1981). The court held
that the actual incompetence standard applies to both appointed and retained counsel. Id.
136. 97 Il.App. 3d 439, 422 N.E.2d 1084 (1981).
137. Id at 443, 422 N.E.2d at 1088.
138. But see People v. Dowd, 101 Il.App. 3d 830, 850-51, 428 N.E.2d 894, 909 (1981) (different division of the First District Illinois Appellate Court holding that "farce or sham" test applies
to retained counsel ineffectiveness).
139. People v. Henry, 103 111.App. 3d 1143, 432 N.E.2d 359 (1982); People v. Corder, 103 111.
App. 3d 434, 431 N.E.2d 701 (1982); People v. Surges, 101 Ill.
App. 3d 962, 973, 428 N.E.2d 1012,
1020 (1981); People v. Dean, 99 Ill. App. 3d 999, 1003, 426 N.E.2d 279, 282 (1981); People v.
Watson, 98 Ill. App. 3d 296, 299-300, 424 N.E.2d 329, 333 (1981).
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dual standard.
One such case is People v. Corder.'40 The defendant was tried and
convicted of a drug offense. The only evidence linking Corder to the
crime was the testimony of an undercover police officer who testified
that he bought heroin from a clean-shaven man introduced as Richard
Corder. '4'
The mainstay of Corder's defense was that he had worn a beard
since 1972.142 Although the accused's retained lawyer called one witness who testified that Corder had continually worn a beard, the wit43
ness had not seen the defendant near the time of the crime.'
In his amended petition for post-conviction relief, Corder alleged
that his trial attorney failed to present corroborating evidence about the
beard. At his post-conviction hearing, Corder presented three witnesses and affidavits from two potential witnesses, all of whom testified
that Corder wore a beard on the day of the alleged heroin sale.' 44
Moreover, the defendant testified that he presented his trial counsel
with a list containing the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of
the exculpatory witnesses three weeks before trial.' 45 Corder's driver's
license photograph, taken six days after the subject occurrence, showed
that the defendant wore a beard. Counsel knew of the driver's license a
full month before trial, but did not introduce it into evidence.' 4 6 Defense counsel made little effort to contact the witnesses, did not subpoena the witnesses, and failed to seek a subpoena duces tecum for
Corder's driver's license.
The court in Corder noted that the dual standard, had recently
been rejected in Talley and Scott, and condemned by the United States
Supreme Court in Cuyler v. Sullivan. The court abrogated the twotiered standard, holding that "[t]he better view. . . supported by precedent . . .[is] that the standard for retained counsel must rise to that
for appointed counsel." 47 The Third District found that trial counsel's
failure to interview or subpoena any of the exculpatory witnesses constituted actual incompetency which substantially harmed the accused,
probably causing an adverse outcome. The court reversed the denial of
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

103 I11.
App. 3d 434, 431 N.E.2d 701 (1982).
Id at 435, 431 N.E.2d at 701.
Id at 436, 431 N.E.2d at 702.
Id
Id at 436, 431 N.E.2d at 703.
Id
Id. at 436-37, 431 N.E.2d at 703.
103 Ill.
App. 3d at 437-38, 431 N.E.2d at 704.
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Corder's petition for post-conviction relief and remanded the case for a
new trial.
The untenable nature of Illinois' dual standard and use of the
"farce or sham" test have recently been brought into sharper focus in a
case where, like Corder, retained trial counsel failed to secure available
exonerating witnesses. In United States ex rel Cosey v. Wolff,' 4 8 the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois declared that Illinois courts commit a constitutional error by using the
9
"farce or sham" test. 1
Larry Cosey was convicted in the Circuit Court of Cook County of
attempted murder, armed robbery and aggravated battery. 150 He appealed his conviction, alleging ineffective assistance by his retained
lawyer. The Illinois Appellate Court denied Cosey's claim because
counsel's alleged incompetency did not reduce the trial to a "farce or
sham." 151
Cosey's retained trial counsel did not locate any witnesses to support his client's statement that he was not at the scene of the alleged
assault and robbery. 152 Between Cosey's conviction and sentencing, his
lawyer on appeal quickly gathered the affidavits of five exculpatory
witnesses. The collective testimony of the witnesses would have indicated that (1) the defendant was not on the premises of alleged assault
at the time of the occurrence; (2) no gunfire or other disruptive noises
were heard in and around the building at the time of the alleged shooting and brawl; and (3) the condition of the room where the alleged
shooting and beating took place was the same before and after the supposed incident. 153 The trial court had convicted Cosey largely on the
testimony of the victim, a drug addict, that Cosey had shot at and
beaten the victim during a lengthy fracas. 54 The Illinois Appellate
Court held that counsel's failure to investigate and properly prepare the
case, as indicated by his failure to locate and interview any of the potentially exculpatory witnesses, did not amount to ineffective assistance,
because the trial proceedings were not thereby reduced to a farce or
sham. 1 55 The Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal, and the
148. 526 F. Supp. 788 (N.D. I11. 1981), rev'dper curiam on other grounds, 682 F.2d 691 (7th
Cir. 1982).
149. Id at 790. Accord United States ex rel. Cosey v. Wolff, 682 F.2d 691, 693 (7th Cir. 1982);
Wade v. Franzen, 678 F.2d 56, 58 (7th Cir. 1982).
150. Cosey, 526 F. Supp. at 789.
151. People v. Cosey, 82 Ill. App. 3d 968, 973, 403 N.E.2d 656, 661 (1980).
152. Casey, 526 F. Supp. at 791.
153. Id at 790.
154. Id at 789-90.
155. People v. Cosey, 82 Ill. App. 3d at 973, 403 N.E.2d at 661.
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United States Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of certiorari. 156 Cosey then brought a petition for a writ of habeas corpus' 5 7 in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
alleging constitutional violations in the proceedings in the Circuit
Court of Cook County and in the First District Illinois Appellate
Court.158

In considering Cosey's motion for summary judgment during the
habeas corpus proceedings, Judge Shadur ruled that "[in applying the
'farce or sham' test the Illinois Appellate Court committed error of constitutional dimensions."' 5 9 The court noted that, for many years, the
Seventh Circuit has employed a "minimum standard of professional
representation" as its formulation for evaluating claims of ineffectiveness of counsel.160 Judge Shadur also pointed out that a different panel
of the same appellate court that upheld Cosey's conviction under the
"farce or sham" test had abolished the test' 6 1 in response to the United
States Supreme Court mandate of Cuyler v. Sullivan.
In order to obtain relief in the habeas corpus proceedings, Cosey
was required to show that (1) his counsel's performance fell below a
minimum standard of representation and (2) his defense was harmed as
a result. Judge Shadur said that trial counsel's failure to locate any of
the five exonerating witnesses demonstrated a level of representation
below "[tihe skill of the experienced practitioner. . . . In essence, Cosey was sent to prison for 20 years after a trial in which his defense was
never made."' 62 The court quoted from United States ex rel. Williams
v. Twomey, 16 3 to illuminate its holding:
The Constitution, unlike the judicial oath, does not go so far as to
promise equal justice to the poor and to the rich. Yet it does not
156. Cosey v. Illinois, 449 U.S. 1115 (1981).
157. When an incarcerated prisoner files a petition for a writ of habeas corpus the petitioner is
asking the court to hold an evidentiary hearing on his claim. Since the attack is collateral, matters
outside the formal record may be relied upon. The petition must allege factual examples of ineffectiveness, because general, conclusory allegations of ineffective trial representation will not necessitate the holding of a hearing. If a hearing is granted, the determination will proceed as to
whether counsel's representation was effective. See Waltz, supra note 4, at 295-96; Gard, supra
note 4.
158. United States ex rel. Cosey v. Wolff, 526 F. Supp. 788, 789 (N.D. Ill. 1981), rev'dper
curiam on other grounds, 682 F.2d 691 (7th Cir. 1982).
159. Id at 790.
160. United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640-41 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied sub noma., Sielaff v. Williams, 423 U.S. 876 (1975).
161. People v. Talley, 97 111.App. 3d 439, 442-43, 422 N.E.2d 1084, 1087-88 (1981). See also
People v. Scott, 94 Ill. App. 3d 159, 418 N.E.2d 805 (1981) and cases cited infra note 207.
162. Cosey, 526 F. Supp. at 791-92.
163. 510 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom., Sielaff v. Williams, 423 U.S. 876
(1975).

CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW

leave the poor to a representation which is in any aspect . . . shockingly inferior to what may be expected of the prosecution's representation. While a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants
are expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it
a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators. 164

The court found that the testimony of five exculpatory witnesses
probably would have affected the trial court's perception of the victim's
testimony, the major factor in Cosey's conviction.' 65 Judge Shadur
reasoned that the trial court may well have assumed from the lack of
66
affirmative witnesses on Cosey's behalf that none was available.,
Even part of the testimony from the exonerating witnesses might have
' ' 67
supplied the "reasonable doubt mandating an acquittal for Cosey. 1
Because the Illinois Appellate Court acted unconstitutionally by employing the "farce or sham" standard, and because Cosey was able to
show that he was denied a minimum standard of professional representation, Judge Shadur issued the writ of habeas corpus, directing the
168
state to release Cosey to. re-try him promptly.
Although the Seventh Circuit recently reversed and remanded Cosey, 16 9 the court agreed with Judge Shadur that, in applying the "farce
or sham" branch of its two-tiered standard, "[tihe Illinois Appellate
Court made an incorrect legal determination."'' 7 0 The Seventh Circuit
in Cosey held that the district court erred in granting Cosey's motion
for summary judgment because it did not have a sufficient factual record to determine whether counsel's failure to call the five exculpatory
witnesses was due to counsel's failure to meet minimum standards of
professional representation or was a matter of trial strategy. '7 However, the court agreed with Judge Shadur that "[iln light of the erroneous standard applied by the Illinois Appellate Court, the district court
had to decide whether Cosey's counsel failed to meet constitutional
standards."' 172 Moreover, another recent Seventh Circuit decision,
may sound the death knell for the "farce or sham"
Wade v. Franzen ,'173
test in Illinois.
In Wade, the defendant was convicted of murder after a jury trial.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Cosey, 526 F. Supp. at 792, quoting, Twomey, 510 F.2d at 640.
Cosey, 526 F. Supp. at 790.
Id at 792.
Id

168. Id

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

United States ex rel. Cosey v. Wolff, 682 F.2d 691 (7th Cir. 1982).
Id at 693.
Id at 693-94.
Id at 693.
678 F.2d 56 (7th Cir. 1982).
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On appeal, Wade urged that his retained counsel had provided ineffective representation. The Illinois Appellate Court, using the "farce or

74
sham" test, held that defense counsel's representation was adequate.'

The Seventh Circuit, in reviewing the dismissal of Wade's habeas
corpus petition, noted the following errors by trial counsel:
(1) Counsel waived his strongest pretrial motion because he was
unaware of fundamental principles in the law of self-incrimination.

(2)

75

Defense counsel made inculpatory remarks during his open76

ing statement. 1

(3) During cross-examination of the state's witnesses, the attor177
ney asked questions tending to inculpate his client.
(4) the only significant fact in defendant's favor was that the
murder weapon had never been found. However, defense counsel negated any resultant advantage by suggesting to witnesses locations
where the firearm may have been concealed.

78

The court stated that, in applying the "farce or sham" test, the
Illinois Appellate Court "[a]pplied the wrong standard."'' 79 The court
observed that the Supreme Court has held that the constitutional standard for ineffective assistance is the same for retained and appointed
counsel 80 and that the applicable standard in the Seventh Circuit is
"minimum professional competence," not "farce or sham."' 8 ' Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal of
Wade's habeas corpus petition and remanded the case for further
82

proceedings. 1

Finally, one Illinois Supreme Court Justice argues that Illinois
courts should abandon the two-tiered standard and the "farce or sham"
test in favor of a single test of ineffectiveness for both appointed and
174. People v. Wade, 71 111. App. 3d 1013, 1019-20, 389 N.E.2d 1230, 1235-36 (1979).
175. Contrary to Summons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389-94 (1968), counsel believed that
Wade's attestation to the allegations in a motion for a hearing on the voluntariness of the defendant's confession would constitute a waiver of his self-incrimination rights. Wade, 678 F.2d at 57.
176. Id
177. Id.
178. id at 58.
179. Id.
180. Id (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 466 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1980)).
181. Id. (citing United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 641 (7th Cir. 1975)).
Defense counsel in Wade was a real estate attorney with no prior experience at the criminal bar
and scant knowledge of criminal procedure. Id at 57. Wade's attorney would certainly be labeled ineffective under the following standard proposed by Professor Finer: "[wihether counsel
exhibited the normal and customary degree of skill possessed by attorneys who are fairly skilled in
the criminal law and who have a fair amount of experience at the criminal bar." Finer, supra note
4, at 1080.
182. 678 F.2d at 59.
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retained counsel. In People v. Murphy, 1 8 3 Justice Clark wrote that
"[tihe time has come to abandon the 'farce or sham' and 'no representation at all'" tests.' 84 The Justice argued that ineffective assistance is
little better than none. 8 5 Since non-lawyers cannot be presumed to be
able to evaluate the competency of the attorneys they retain, the dual
standard should be abolished. 86 Moreover, Justice Clark asserted that
"[b]y licensing attorneys . . . this court has, to some degree, placed its
imprimatur upon their competence, and is estopped from asserting caveat emptor as to their incompetence."'' 87 Lastly, the "farce or sham"
test evades the issue of whether an attorney skillfully performed his
duties. The "farce or sham" standard emphasizes errors which counsel
did not commit, as proof of his competence, and to assume that counsel's miscues reflect planned trial tactics, even though these errors may
88
actually reflect inadequate preparation.
The mounting attack on the "farce or sham" test and the dual
standard applied by Illinois courts, makes it appropriate for Illinois to
adopt a new approach to the law of ineffective assistance, such as an
ineffectiveness test supplemented by guidelines, e.g., the American Bar
183. 72 Ill. 2d 421, 381 N.E.2d 677 (1978).
184. Id at 440, 381 N.E.2d at 687 (Clark, J., specially concurring). Justice Clark advocated
adoption of the Seventh Circuit's test described in Twomey. Id. See United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 641 (7th Cir. 1975).
185. 72 Ill. 2d at 442, 381 N.E.2d at 687-88.
186. Commentators have questioned the use of a dual standard for more than a decade. See,
e.g., Polur, Retained Counsel, Assigned Counsel- Why the Dichotomy?, 55 A.B.A.J. 254 (1969).
Polur asserts that the rationale for the dual standard---one hiring his own lawyer makes a considered, informed choice of counsel in the jail or in-custody setting-is a fiction. The author submits
that the dual standard undermines constitutional hallmarks of equal protection of the laws and
due process of law. Under a dual standard, people who are represented by appointed counsel are
more fully cloaked with sixth amendment protection of the right to assistance of counsel than are
those who retain private counsel. Polur aptly concludes that "[olne is left with the feeling that the
citizen's right to meaningful assistance of counsel is reserved exclusively for those fortunate
enough to be poverty striken and, therefore, to have assigned or appointed counsel defending
them." Id at 256. Accord United States ex rel. Hart v. Davenport, 478 F.2d 203, 211 (3d Cir.
1973).
187. People v. Murphy, 72 111.2d 421, 442-43, 381 N.E.2d 677, 688 (1978) (citation omitted).
In the same connection, Justice Brennan said:
if responsibility for [ineffective assistance of counsel] must be apportioned between the
parties, it is the State, through its attorney's admissions and certification policies, that is
more fairly held to blame for the fact that practicing lawyers too often are ill-prepared or
ill-equipped to act carefully and knowledgeably ...
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 114 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
188. 72 Ill. 2d at 443, 381 N.E.2d at 688, citing, People v. Witherspoon, 55 Ill. 2d 18, 21-22, 302
N.E.2d 3, 4-5 (1973); People v. Steel, 52 Ill. 2d 442, 451-53, 288 N.E.2d 355, 361-62 (1972); People
v. Washington, 41 Ill. 2d 16, 20-22, 241 N.E.2d 425, 427-29 (1968). See also People v. Bynum, 102
Ill. App. 3d 461, 467, 430 N.E.2d 110, 114 (1981) ("competency of counsel ispresumed and this
presumption can be overcome only by strong and convincing proof," citing, People v. McCraven,
97 Ill. App. 3d 1075, 424 N.E.2d 23 (1981)).
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Association StandardsRelating to the Defense Function,189 for minimum
duties of criminal defense lawyers.
V.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A NEW APPROACH TO THE LAW OF
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN ILLINOIS

A. A StandardBased Upon Enumeration of Specific Minimum Duties
The shortcomings of one-sentence standards such as "farce or
sham," "actual incompetence," and "minimum standard of professional representation" can be overcome by adoption of an "enumeration" approach. Such an approach supplements a counsel effectiveness
test with guidelines listing specific duties of criminal defense attorneys.
The American Bar Association's Project Standards/orCriminalJustice,
Standards Relating to the Defense Function' 90 has been used by
courts' 9 ' and endorsed by commentators 92 as a list of defense counsel
duties which provides good measures of competence of representation.
Coles v. Peyton 193 was an early attempt to review a claim of ineffectiveness by reference to a list of the responsibilities of criminal defense lawyers. In Coles, the Fourth Circuit granted a petition for
habeas corpus after a state conviction for rape. The defendant alleged
in his petition that the state unconstitutionally suppressed crucial exonerating evidence, and that want of counsel at his preliminary hearing
constituted denial of his right to counsel. 194 The court held that the
failure of the accused's appointed counsel to clarify the elements of the
offense to the defendant, to interview witnesses, and to investigate the
prosecutrix' reputation denied the accused his right to effective assistance. 195 The court assessed defense counsel's effectiveness in light of an
enumeration of duties taken from earlier Fourth Circuit ineffectiveness
189. DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 13.
190. Id
191. See infra cases cited in notes 274-85.
192. See Bazelon, supra note 4; Defective Assistance, supra note 4; Clark, The American Bar
Association Standardsfor CriminalJustice: Prescriptionfor an Ailing System, 47 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 429 (1972); Jameson, The Beginning: Background and Development of the ABA Standardsfor
CriminalJustice, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 255 (1974); Note,A New Look, supra note 3;Note, "'Reasonably Effective Assistance" Standardis Applicable to Both Retainedand Appointed Counsel Without Distinction, 13 ST. MARY'S L. REV. 163 (1981).
193. 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968).
194. 389 F.2d at 225.
195. The court also noted that the attorneys assigned to represent the petitioner were
representing fifty-seven other felony defendants whose cases were scheduled for trial that term, id
at 225, that the lawyers were unaware of a medical report prepared immediately after the arrest
which stated that slides and swabs from a medical examination of the prosecutrix showed no
evidence of spermatozoa or seminal stains, id at 226, and that counsel had conducted only three
brief interviews with the petitioner while investigating the case. Id
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cases. 196
While Co/es assumed a leading role in applying a list of criminal
defense counsel's duties to evaluate ineffectiveness allegations, the list
propounded in Co/es was brief. Promulgation of the American Bar
Association's Standards for the Defense Function 97 fosters a more
comprehensive analysis in evaluating claims of ineffective assistance.
The Defense Standards provide specific guidelines for every stage
in the process of criminal defense, from initial client interview 9 8
through post-conviction remedies.199 The Standards reflect a sustained
effort to establish the components of proficient defense representation.
They are a synthesis of diverse viewpoints from eminent judges, trial
lawyers, and law professors.
For example, in State v. Harper,20 Wisconsin's high court abolished the "farce or sham" test, adopted a "community standards" approach,20 ' and endorsed several parts of the ABA Standards as
guideposts for evaluating ineffectiveness claims. The court alluded to
several alleged errors in counsel's representation, including his failure
196. The Co/es court said:
Counsel for an indigent defendant should be appointed promptly. Counsel should be
afforded a reasonable opportunity to prepare to defend an accused. Counsel must confer
with his client without undue delay and as often as necessary, to advise him of his rights
and to elicit matters of defense or to ascertain that potential defenses are unavailable.
Counsel must conduct appropriate investigations, both factual and legal, to determine if
matters of defense can be developed, and to allow himself enough time for reflection and
preparation for trial.
Id at 226 (footnote omitted) (citing Twiford v. Peyton, 372 F.2d 670 (4th Cir. 1967); Martin v.
Virginia, 365 F.2d 549 (4th Cir. 1966); Braxton v. Peyton, 365 F.2d 563 (4th Cir. 1966)).
The court in Co/es went on to set up a burden-shifting rule whereby a showing of failure to
fulfill one of the listed duties would establish ineffectiveness unless the government could demonstrate an absence of prejudice. Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d at 226. The prejudice issue is analyzed
infra text accompanying notes 223-254.
197. DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 13. See also the checklist to be used by lawyers when
preparing a case in Report on the Criminal Justice Act of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, 36 F.R.D. 277, 338-41 (1965).

198. DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 13, at § 3.1(a).
199. Id at § 8.5.
200. 57 Wis. 2d 543, 205 N.W.2d 1 (1973). Harper's automobile was illegally searched by a
Chicago police officer. The fruits of the illegal search provided the basis for arrest, indictment,
and conviction of armed robbery. The defendant's court-appointed lawyer made scant preparation for trial, as a result of which he was unaware of the illegally obtained evidence. Consequently, counsel did not move for suppression of the tainted evidence, and it was received in
evidence at trial. id at 548, 205 N.W.2d at 4.
201. Id at 557, 205 N.W.2d at 9. Wisconsin's new test inquires whether counsel's advocacy
was "equal to that which the ordinarily prudent lawyer, skilled and versed in the criminal law.
would give to clients who had privately retained his services." Id Cf People v. Kirkrand, 14 Ill.
2d 86, 92, 150 N.E.2d 788, 790 (1958) (Schaefer, J.) ("Appointed counsel is held to the standard of
diligence and competence that is to be expected of the lawyer who is retained to represent his
client.").
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to obtain available police reports. 20 2 The lawyer's failure to inspect
relevant records was held contrary to the Standards 20 3 and detrimental
to proper investigation.
Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit adopted the "enumeration" scheme in United States
v. DeCoster.20 4 The record in DeCoster showed several errors in defense counsel's performance, including improper filing of a bail motion,
lack of preparation for presenting alibi witnesses, failure to discover
that the defendant's alleged accomplices had pled guilty before the
judge assigned to hear DeCoster's case, and offering only one defense
witness at trial (whose testimony was damaging to the defense). 20 5 The
District of Columbia Circuit approved a "reasonable attorney" formulation, 2°6 but added that an enumeration of counsel's responsibilities is
an essential supplement to a one phrase test. 20 7 The court held that
criminal defense attorneys should look to the ABA Standards for guidance and further held
Specfcally-(l) Counsel should confer with his client without delay

and as often as necessary to elicit matters of defense, or to ascertain
that potential defenses are unavailable. Counsel should discuss fully
potential strategies and tactical choices with this client.
(2) Counsel should promptly advise his client of his rights and take
all actions necessary to preserve them. . . Counsel should also be
concerned with the accused's right to be released from custody pending trial and be prepared, where appropriate, to make motions for a
pre-trial psychiatric examination or for the suppression of evidence.
(3) Counsel must conduct appropriate investigations, both factual
and legal, to determine what matters of defense can be developed
• . . This means that in most cases a defense attorney, or his agent,
should interview not only his own witnesses but also those that the
government intends to call, when they are accessible. The investigation should always include efforts to secure information in the possession of the prosecution and law-enforcement authorities. And, of
course, the duty to investigate also requires adequate legal
202. 57 Wis. 2d at 553-54, 205 N.W.2d at 7.
203. DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 13, at § 4.1 (duty to investigate). The court also criticized the attorney's failure to interview his client until shortly before trial (§ 3.2(a)), his failure to
move for change of venue (§§ 3.6, 5.2), and his failure to make a timely presentation of alibi notice
or move to suppress a lineup identification and evidence found in the trunk of the defendant's car
(§ 3.6). 57 Wis. 2d at 550-57, 205 N.W.2d at 6-9.
204. 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
205. Id at 1200-01.

206. "1A defendant is entitled to the reasonablycompetent assistance ofan attorney actingas his
diligent conscientious advocate." Id at 1202 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
207. Id at 1203. The court also adopted a burden-shifting rule whereby, upon a showing of a
substantial violation of one of counsel's duties, the burden shifts to the government to show a lack
of prejudice thereby. Accord Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849
(1968).
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research. 20 8

Finding that the trial record "[p]oses more questions about counsel's
preparation and investigation than it answers, '20 9 the court remanded
the case for a hearing on the issue of counsel's trial preparation and
210
performance.
Applying the Standards to a few cases in which defendants were
denied relief under the "farce or sham" test will show that the Standards lead to more just decisions. In People v. Heirens,21 1 a privately
retained attorney decided not to prepare an insanity defense because he
did not want his client to be returned to society. 212 Analyzing Heirens
21 3
under the Defense Standards, using Judge Bazelon's tripartite test,
shows that:
(1) Counsel violated a duty set forth in Section 1.6 of the ABA
21 4
standards.
(2) The violation of counsel's duty to his client was substantial.
Depriving one's client of a possibly valid defense to a murder charge in
order to protect society from him is a grievous breach of Section 1.6.
(3) Heirens was prejudiced by his attorney's sua sponte withdrawal of the accused's only possible valid defense. In Heirens, the
state failed to establish that no prejudice resulted from defense coun21 5
sel's representation.
208. 487 F.2d at 1203-04 (footnotes omitted). But see Satillian v. State, 470 S.W.2d 677, 679
(Tex. Crim. App. 197 1) (ignorance of the applicable law does not constitute ineffective assistance
of counsel).
209. 487 U.S. at 1201.
210. On remand, the district judge found adequate assistance of counsel and declined to grant
a new trial. The District of Columbia Circuit reversed. United States v. DeCoster, No. 72-1283
(D.C. Cir., filed October 19, 1976) (unpublished opinion reproduced as an appendix to United
States v. DeCoster, 624 F.2d 196, 300 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 944 (1979)). The
panel, the same as the one in the original case, split 2-1. On rehearing en banc, the plurality
rejected the use of the ABA Standards, 624 F.2d at 214, over a vociferous dissent by Judge
Bazelon, joined by Chief Judge Wright. Id. at 264.
In his dissent, Judge Bazelon outlined the tripartite inquiry first articulated in DeCoster1,487
F.2d 1197, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, J.)for reviewing inadequacy of counsel allegations:
(1) Did counsel violate one of the articulated duties?
(2) Was the violation "substantial"?
(3) Has the government established that no prejudice resulted?
DeCoster 111, 624 F.2d at 275 (Bazelon,J.,dissenting) joined by Wright, C.J.).
211. 4 I11. 2d 131, 122 N.E.2d 231 (1954). See supra text accompanying notes 99-112.
212. Id. at 141, 122 N.E.2d at 237.
213. See supra note 213.
214. DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 13, at § 1.6 (client interests are paramount): [The
duties of a lawyer to his client are to represent his legitimate interests, and considerations of
personal and professional advantage should not influence his advice or performance."
215. Heirens' murder conviction was affirmed under the "farce or sham" formulation. 4 Ill. 2d
at 144, 122 N.E.2d at 238.
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In United States v. Katz, 2 16 also the court excused severe misconduct under the "farce or sham" test. In Katz, defense counsel was disgruntled over having to try the case, and was sleeping during the trial
proceedings. Section 7.1 of the Defense Standards provides that "[t]he
lawyer should support the. . . dignity of the courtroom by strict adherence to the rules of decorum and by manifesting an attitude of respect
toward the judge, opposing counsel, witnesses and jurors." Under
Judge Bazelon's three-pronged test, the defendant had a colorable
claim of inadequate representation. Under the "farce or sham" standard, the man with the somnabulent attorney went to the penitentiary. 2 17 Many defendants deserving of post-conviction relief are sent
home (or, more likely, to prison) empty-handed when their lawyer's
2 18
competence is measured by the "farce or sham" formulation.
Adopting the enumeration approach in Illinois would greatly improve the disposition of ineffectiveness claims. 21 9 A clear statement of
the elements of effective representation offers a uniform standard
against which all Illinois courts can assess the performance of criminal
defense lawyers. The standards are not excessively rigid. Rather, the
guideposts will aid the Illinois Appellate Courts in the discharge of
their responsibilities, by establishing a common ground on which they
may decide on the facts of each case. Illinois courts should embrace
the enumeration framework lest Professor Waltz' pessimistic statement
in 1963 that "[u]nsatisfactory as it may seem to those desirous of objective, prospectively usable standards, all of these judicial admonitions
can only be translated as the familiar command that persons accused of
crime be accorded a fair trial' "220 becomes a prophecy for the future.
Finally, Illinois courts should not only abandon the current dual standard,22 ' but should also eliminate the requirement that the defendant
216. 425 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1970).
217. Id
218. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 88.
219. Judge Bazelon, a moving force in the development of such an approach, concludes that:
Dealing with the ineffectiveness issue in terms of a duty of care, with specific acts and
omissions presumed to be violations, furthers the development of clear standards which
inform courts and lawyers of the minimum requirements for rendering effective assistance. But this approach is still flexible enough to discourage lawyers from relying on
these standards as articulations of all that they may be required to do.
Defectipe Assistance, supra note 4, at 33.
220. Waltz, supra note 4 at 305.
221. Section 3.9 of the DEFENSE STANDARDS contemplates a single standard for assessing both
appointed and retained counsel competence: "Once a lawyer has undertaken the representation of
an accused his duties and obligations are the same whether he is privately retained, appointed by
the court, or serving in a legal aid or defender system."
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prove that counsel's incompetence caused substantial prejudice to the
defense, without which the result would have been different.
B.

Harmless ErrorApproach

Ineffective assistance of counsel is a disfavored ground of relief, as
reflected in the harsh standards against which many courts measure
counsel inadequacy. Courts have also limited ineffectiveness of counsel relief by requiring that the accused prove prejudice, i e., that his
attorney's incompetence caused an adverse verdict or unduly harsh
sentence.
Courts have taken four approaches to the prejudice question.
First, some decisions require the aggrieved defendant to show not only
attorney incompetence, but also harmful consequences. 222 Second,
some courts maintain that an accused who shows ineffective assistance
223
of counsel is not required to show that he was prejudiced thereby.
Third, some courts hold that once the claimant proves inadequate representation, the burden shifts to the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that counsel's failings were harmless error. 224 Fourth,
some jurisdictions require that the accused show incompetence of
counsel plus likely prejudice. Once the defendant shows a likelihood
that ineffective representation influenced the trial outcome, the burden
shifts to the government to show that no prejudice actually occurred. 22 5
222. This is the formulation used in Illinois appointed counsel cases. See People v. Greer, 79
Ill. 2d 103, 120-21, 402 N.E.2d 203, 211 (1980) ("it must be established that counsel was actually
incompetent in the performance of his duties and that substantial prejudice resulted from such
incompetency, without which the results of the trial would have been different.")
The Seventh Circuit, in a very recent decision, has disapproved, by implication, the prejudice
formulation endorsed by Illinois courts. Wade v. Franzen, 678 F.2d 56, 59 (7th Cir. 1982). See
also Morris v. Slappy, 103 S. Ct. 1610, 1618 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in the result).
223. See Gilbert v. Sowders, 646 F.2d 1146, 1150 (6th Cir. 1981) (Jones, J., concurring) (per
curiam); Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696-97 (6th Cir. 1974); Goodwin v. Cardwell, 432
F.2d 521, 522 (6th Cir. 1970); Flener v. Commonwealth, 514 S.W.2d 201 (Ky. 1974). See also
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942) ("The right to have the assistance of counsel is too
fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of
prejudice resulting from its denial."); McQueen v. State, 475 S.W.2d I 11, 123 (Mo. 1971) (en banc)
("To insist that the defendant now ... show specific prejudice is requiring him to establish by his
own efforts the very things for which the law recognized he needed the assistance of counsel in the
first place and which he did not receive.") (Seiler, J., dissenting).
224. See Wade v. Franzen, 678 F.2d 56, 59 (7th Cir. 1982) (by implication); United States v.
Bosch, 584 F.2d 1113 (1st Cir. 1978); United States v. Crowley, 529 F.2d 1066, 1069 (3d Cir. 1976);
Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968); People v. Pope, 23
Cal. 3d 412, 590 P.2d 859, 152 Cal. Rptr. 732 (1979).
In two recent cases, the Eighth Circuit approved the harmless error approach to the prejudice
issue, without expressly adopting it. Hawkman v. Parratt, 661 F.2d 1161, 1169 (8th Cir. 1981);
Thomas v. Wyrick, 535 F.2d 407, 414-17 (8th Cir. 1976).
225. United States v. DeCoster, 624 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 944
(1979); Cooper v. Campbell, 597 F.2d 628 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 852 (1979); Cooper v.
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Illinois courts adhere to the first approach. The contours of this
226
formulation are revealed by two Illinois cases, one denying relief,
and one granting a evidentiary hearing on the defendant's ineffective227
ness allegations.
In People v. Bynum ,228 the defendant alleged that he received inadequate representation because his appointed lawyer:
(1) conferred with the accused for the first time only five days
prior to trial;
(2) failed to obtain transcripts of lengthy pretrial proceedings;
(3) erroneously made a motion to dismiss the case against one of
the other defendants; and
(4) mistakenly objected to a motion to suppress a confession
229
which named his client as one of the offenders.
Counsel's unpreparedness resulted in his not being aware of aliases used by his client and another defendant. This led counsel to
make two motions against his own client's best interests. 230 The court
held that these instances of counsel unpreparedness did not demonstrate ineffectiveness, because counsel's errors did not substantially
23
prejudice the defendant or cause an adverse trial result. '
In People v. Stephen, 2 32 a case involving a voluntary manslaughter conviction, appointed counsel provided ineffective representation:
(1) Counsel unauthorizedly admitted his client's guilt during
closing argument;
(2) The attorney failed to interview available occurrence witnesses who would have testified that the victim was brandishing a
weapon at the time of the subject occurrence; and
(3) The lawyer failed to interview an occurrence witness who
would have testified that it was general knowledge that the decedent
Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978) (en bane), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979); United States
v. Williams, 575 F.2d 388 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 987 (1978); Commonwealth v. Bolduc,
375 Mass. 530, 378 N.E.2d 661 (1978); People v. Garcia, 398 Mich. 250, 247 N.W.2d 547 (1976);
State v. Mays, 203 Neb. 487, 279 N.W.2d 146 (1979); State v. Amb'rosino, 114 R.I. 199, 329 A.2d
398 (1974); Peyton v. Fields, 207 Va. 40, 147 S.E.2d 762 (1966).
226. People v. Bynum, 102 Ill. App. 3d 461, 430 N.E.2d 110 (1981).
227. People v. Stepheny, 46 111.2d 153, 263 N.E.2d 83 (1970).
228. 102 Ill. App. 3d 461, 430 N.E.2d 110 (1981).
229. Id. at 466, 430 N.E.2d at 114-15.
230. Bynum's lawyer made a motion to dismiss Bynum because the indictment used an alias
which referred to a different defendant. Moreover, counsel objected to a motion by a codefendant
to suppress Gary Smith's confession. The confession named Bynum as one of the offenders.
Counsel was unaware because the name printed on the confession was his client's alias. Id at 466,
430 N.E.2d at 115.
231. Id
232. 46 111.2d 153, 263 N.E.2d 83 (1970).
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had killed one person and had spent time in prison for the killing of
233
another person.
The court held that counsel's failure to locate available key witnesses showed actual incompetence. 234 Furthermore, the fact that the
missing testimony would have corroborated defendant's testimony substantially prejudiced the defendant's case. The court found that the
testimony "could well have produced a different result, ' 235 and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on the ineffectiveness of
counsel.

236

Chapman v. Ca[fornia237 requires the prosecution to prove an absence of prejudice once the defendant has shown that he received ineffective assistance. In Chapman, the Court announced a harmless error
rule that avoids automatic reversals for constitutional errors. The prosecution can maintain a conviction by proving that any constitutional
238
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The First, Third, Fourth and Seventh Circuits follow the harmless
error approach. 239 The Fourth Circuit's rule, for example, is that counsel's failure to abide by the listed requirements of defense representation "[c]onstitutes a denial of effective representation of counsel unless
the state, on which is cast the burden of proof once a violation of these
precepts is shown, can establish lack of prejudice thereby. 24° The California Supreme Court has also adopted the harmless error formulation.24 ' In two recent cases the Eighth Circuit has approved, without
242
expressly adopting, the harmless error approach.
The harmless error approach strikes a middle course between the
Illinois rule which requires the defendant to show not only ineffective
assistance, but also resultant prejudice, and the rule adopted by some
courts that reversal is automatic, if the claimant shows ineffectiveness.
The rationale for an automatic reversal approach stems from the
233. Id at 154-56, 263 N.E.2d at 84-85.
234. Id at 158, 263 N.E.2d at 86.
235. Id
236. Id at 159, 263 N.E.2d at 87.
237. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
238. Id at 24. The harmless error rule applies to denials of constitutional rights in both state
and federal proceedings. Id at 20-21.
239. Wade v. Franzen, 678 F.2d 56, 59 (7th Cir. 1982) (by implication); United States v.
Bosch, 584 F.2d 1113 (1st Cir. 1978); United States v. Crowley, 529 F.2d 1066 (3d Cir. 1976); Coles
v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968).
240. Id. at 226.
241. People v. Pope, 23 Cal. 3d 412, 590 P.2d 859, 152 Cal. Rptr. 732 (1979).
242. Hawkman v, Parratt, 661 F.2d 1161, 1169 (8th Cir. 1981); Thomas v. Wyrick, 535 F.2d
407, 414-17 (8th Cir. 1976).
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Supreme Court's decisions in Glasser v. United States, 243 Chapman v.
California,244 and McMann v. Richardson.245
Glasser indicated that "[tihe right to have the assistance of counsel
is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice cal' 246
culations as to the amount of prejudice resulting from its denial.
The Chapman Court stated that the harmless error rule should not apply to denial of the right to counsel, holding that denial of such right
mandates automatic reversal. 24 7 Finally, the McMann Court said "Ji]t
has long been recognized that the right to counsel is the right to the
effective assistance of counsel." 24 8 Drawing on these cases the Sixth
Circuit in Beasley v. United States249 held that the right to effective
assistance is not subject to harmless error analysis, and afortiori, that
250
denial of the right justifies automatic reversal.
Differing viewpoints on the merits of an automatic reversal rule
have generated lively exchanges. For example, Judge Hufstedler, relying on a long line of Supreme Court precedent, including Glasser,
Chapman and McMann, said, "[t]he right to the assistance of counsel is
so fundamental that failure to provide constitutionally adequate counsel at trial can never be dismissed as harmless error."' 25' By contrast,
Judge Posner wrote, "[ilt is too syllogistic to argue, as Judge Hufstedler
did," that since denial of the right to counsel can never be harmless
error, and because the right to counsel is the right to effective assistance
of counsel, then denial of effective assistance of counsel can never be
252
harmless error.
In summary, the harmless error doctrine compromises between the
competing interests of the defendant and the government. The defendant need not prove prejudice, and the prosecution is allowed to avoid
reversal by proving that an error was harmless. Illinois courts should
follow the lead of the First, Third, Fourth and Seventh Circuit and the
243. 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
244. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
245. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
246. Glasser, 315 U.S. at 76.
247. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23.
248. McMann, 397 U.S. at 771 n.14 (emphasis supplied) (citations omitted).
249. 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974).
250. The court said that "[h]armless error tests do not apply in regard to the deprivation of a
procedural right so fundamental as the effective assistance of counsel." Id. at 696. (citations
omitted).
251. Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1334 (9th Cir. 1978) (en bane) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979).
252. Wade v. Franzen, 678 F.2d 56, 59 (7th Cir. 1982) (citation omitted).
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California courts by adopting the harmless error approach to the
prejudice requirement.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Illinois courts must give full meaning to the sixth amendment right
to effective assistance of counsel. Under current standards, defendants
must shoulder the burdens of proving not only incompetence of coun-

253
sel, but also resultant prejudice. The United States Supreme Court
and eleven federal circuits 254 have repudiated standards similar to

those employed in Illinois. In two recent decisions, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has declared that Illinois
courts act unconstitutionally in applying the "farce or sham" standard. 255 Illinois courts disagree on the proper ineffectiveness standard.

Moreover, the Illinois decisions reflect confusion about application of
the current standards. Recently, several Illinois courts have abolished
the "farce or sham" test and the dual standard in their respective judicial districts. Justice Clark of the Illinois Supreme Court has forcefully
2 56
advocated abolition of the "farce of sham" test.

Such a vital constitutional right as the right to effective assistance
of counsel should not be shrouded in the unfairness of conflicting and
confusing standards. Public confidence in the judiciary, and in the
criminal justice system as a whole, will be undermined by the current
chaos surrounding the law of ineffective assistance of counsel in
Illinois.
The prevailing standards for reviewing claims of ineffective assistance in Illinois are only "empty vessels into which content must be
poured. ' 257 Illinois courts must abolish the "farce or sham" test, and
adopt a test based upon the ABA Standards for the Defense Function.
Illinois courts should also relieve defendants of the onus of proving
that they were prejudiced by their lawyers' ineffectiveness, and place
that burden upon the prosecution, in the form of a harmless error
analysis.

253. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1980).
254. See supra note 18.
255. United States ex re. Cosey v. Wolff, 682 F.2d 691, 693 (7th Cir. 1982); Wade v. Franzen,
678 F.2d 56, 58 (7th Cir. 1982).
256. People v. Murphy, 72 Ill.
2d 421, 440, 381 N.E.2d 677, 686 (1978) (Clark, J., specially
concurring).
257. Bazelon, supra note 4, at 820.

